



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION IV  
1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

January 30, 2020

Mr. Sergio Vazquez  
Site Vice President  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
17265 River Road  
Killona, LA 70057

**SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2019004**

Dear Mr. Vazquez:

On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. On January 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch D  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000382  
License No. NPF-38

Enclosure:  
As stated

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WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000382/2019004 – January 30, 2020

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
**Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000382

License Number: NPF-38

Report Number: 05000382/2019004

Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0002

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Location: Killona, LA 70057

Inspection Dates: October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019

Inspectors: M. Chambers, Physical Security Inspector  
P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
S. Makor, Resident Inspector  
F. Ramirez Munoz, Senior Resident Inspector  
S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
R. Smith, Nuclear Systems Engineer  
C. Speer, Resident Inspector  
T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector

Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch D  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71114.04.

### List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Adequately Implement the Operability Determination Process When Applied to the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000382/2019004-01 Open/Closed	[H.6] - Design Margins	71111.15
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which occurred because the licensee did not perform an operability determination in accordance with licensee procedures. Specifically, the licensee's operability determination, when applied to the auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water temperature control valve, did not consider all the valve's safety functions and mission times as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determination Process," Revision 16.			

### Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05000382/2019-001-00	LER 2019-001-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Past Inoperability of Effluent Accident Monitor Exceeds Allowed Outage Time Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications	71153	Closed
LER	05000382/2019-002-00	LER 2019-002-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Control Room Envelope Declared Inoperable due to Outside Air Intake Isolation Valve Exceeding Closed Stroke Time During Inservice Testing Resulting in Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function	71153	Closed

## PLANT STATUS

The unit operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## REACTOR SAFETY

### 71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Component cooling water train B with train A inoperable for maintenance on October 17, 2019
- (2) Emergency diesel generator B following maintenance on November 2, 2019

### 71111.04S - Equipment Alignment

#### Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the emergency feedwater system on October 9, 2019

### 71111.05Q - Fire Protection

#### Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

- (1) Fire area CT1, dry cooling tower area A on October 3, 2019
- (2) Fire area RAB40, diesel oil storage tank A on October 3, 2019
- (3) Fire area RAB1E, cable vault on November 5, 2019
- (4) Fire area RAB11, battery room 3B on November 5, 2019

## 71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

### Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a period of increased activity due to inclement weather, reactivity changes and instrument calibrations on safety-related systems on December 10, 2019

### Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario on November 20, 2019

## 71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

### Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

- (1) Auxiliary component cooling water system on October 5, 2019
- (2) Maintenance rule program (a)(3) assessment on November 1, 2019
- (3) 480 V station service distribution on December 21, 2019

## 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

### Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

- (1) Risk assessment associated with maintenance on electrical bus 1A and concurrent work on emergency feedwater pump AB on October 15, 2019
- (2) Emergent work review associated with degraded conditions discovered during testing of the component cooling water header train A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve on October 22, 2019

## 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

### Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Operability determinations associated with erratic operation of auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve on October 8, 2019
- (2) Operability determination associated with the failure to align the AB electrical buses due to a relay failure on October 10, 2019

- (3) Operability determination associated with an unexpected shutdown of emergency diesel generator B during surveillance testing on October 28, 2019

#### 71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

##### Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

- (1) Reactor trip circuit breaker 7 following replacement on October 21, 2019
- (2) Emergency diesel generator A following maintenance on November 7, 2019
- (3) Component cooling water pump A following maintenance on December 9, 2019

#### 71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

##### Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

- (1) Component cooling water pump A on October 8, 2019
- (2) Containment spray pump A on October 18, 2019
- (3) Safety injection recirculating header B to refueling water storage pool downstream isolation valve on October 31, 2019

#### 71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation

##### Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise conducted on November 20, 2019. The exercise scenario simulated a loss of coolant accident inside containment; failures of high pressure core injection, component cooling water, and containment spray pumps; an emergency diesel generator trip; and a containment penetration failure causing a monitored and filtered radiological release through the plant stack. Inspectors also observed the licensee's management critique conducted December 11, 2019, and participated in the FEMA Region VI Public Meeting conducted November 21, 2019.

#### 71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

##### Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated Revisions 49 and 50 to the Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan. These evaluations do not constitute NRC approval of the licensee's changes.



#### 71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

##### Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) Simulator training evolution on December 2, 2019

#### 71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation Scenario Review

##### Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the proposed scenario for the Waterford 3 biennial emergency plan exercise to be conducted on November 20, 2019. The licensee submitted the proposed scenario to the NRC on September 19, 2019, in accordance with the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50. The NRC provided comments on the proposed scenario to the licensee on October 15, 2019, in accordance with the requirements of IP 71114.08. The inspectors discussed the scenario with Ms. N. Williams, FEMA Region VI Team Leader, as part of their review of the proposed scenario.

### **OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

#### 71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

##### EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed selected Drill/Exercise Performance opportunities conducted between July 2018 and September 2019

##### EP02: ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed ERO Participation information for the period July 2018 through September 2019

##### EP03: Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors review the results of Alert and Notification system siren tests conducted between July 2018 and September 2019

##### BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)

- (1) October 2018 through September 2019

##### BI02: Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) October 2018 through September 2019

## 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

### Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) Adequacy of risk assessment during emergency feedwater system maintenance work windows on November 20, 2019
- (2) Incore instrumentation boric acid leaks during Refueling Outage 22 on December 11, 2019

### 71153 – Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

#### Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000382/2019-01-00, Past Inoperability of Effluent Accident Monitor Exceeds Allowed Outage Time Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19042A787). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.
- (2) LER 05000382/2019-02-00, Control Room Envelope Declared Inoperable due to Outside Air Intake Isolation Valve Exceeding Closed Stroke Time During Inservice Testing Resulting in Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function (ADAMS Accession No. ML19049A028). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.

## **INSPECTION RESULTS**

Failure to Adequately Implement the Operability Determination Process When Applied to the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000382/2019004-01 Open/Closed	[H.6] - Design Margins	71111.15
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which occurred because the licensee did not perform an operability determination in accordance with licensee procedures. Specifically, the licensee's operability determination, when applied to the auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water temperature control valve, did not consider all the valve's safety functions and mission times as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determination Process," Revision 16.			

Description:

On August 16, 2019, the licensee discovered the auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve, ACC-126A, allowing between 3000 and 5500 gpm despite 0 percent output from its automatic controller. Locally, operators noted the valve modulating between 16 to 100 percent open. Control room operators manually lowered the controller setpoint from 86°F to 84°F, which lead to a steady valve position of 97 percent open and a steady flow of 5500 gpm from the valve.

The licensee initiated condition report (CR) WF3-2019-06698 to document the issue and assess the operability of ACC-126A. The licensee's operability determination concluded that the valve was operable. The operability determination considered the valve's safety functions to open following design basis accidents and to control component cooling water outlet temperature. However, the operability determination did not address the impact modulation would have on the valve's design basis safety function to automatically operate for up to 10 hours to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory following design basis accidents.

A similar condition occurred on September 5, 2019, where CR-WF3-2019-07024 documented erratic operation of ACC-126A and the valve not fully closing. For this occurrence on September 5, 2019, the operability determination specifically considered the design basis function of ACC-126A to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory following design basis accidents and concluded that the valve was inoperable. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a failure associated with the transducer for ACC-126A. The licensee replaced the failed component, tested the valve, and declared it operable on September 6, 2019.

The inspectors noted that the operability for ACC-126A had not been properly evaluated on August 16, 2019, and questioned the licensee's basis for declaring it operable since it was found modulating at that time. This meant that the valve's operability was incorrectly assessed for the 21-day period between August 16 and September 6, 2019, when repairs to the valve were finally completed. Consequently, the licensee performed an engineering calculation, tracked in CR-WF3-2019-07164, and determined that the conditions on August 16, 2019, would have caused the valve to only function automatically for up to 74 minutes following a design basis accident, rather than the 10 hours credited in the licensee's design basis. The failure of ACC-126A to operate automatically for 10 hours as designed would reduce the water inventory margin available in the ultimate heat sink to combat a design basis accident by approximately 25 percent. This reduction in margin was bounded by the assumption that all the wet and dry cooling tower fans were available.

The licensee's evaluation also revealed that the site's technical specifications would allow for the removal of wet and dry cooling tower fans from service depending on ambient air temperatures. If the fans allowed by technical specifications were taken out of service with the condition observed in ACC-126A, the ultimate heat sink system would not have been able to perform its safety function. As a result, the licensee enacted compensatory measures to ensure that all wet cooling tower and dry cooling tower fans were available with the observed condition to ensure adequate ultimate heat sink water inventory. The inspectors noted that these compensatory measures should have been in place since the valve's initial failure on August 16, 2019.

The licensee assesses the operability in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determination Process," Revision 16. Step 8.2 of EN-OP-104 requires that the licensee determine the impact that degraded or nonconforming conditions have on the technical

specification safety functions and mission times. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's operability determination performed for the condition observed on ACC-126A on August 16, 2019, did not meet the requirements of Procedure EN-OP-104 in that it did not consider the impact the observed condition would have on the valve's design basis function to operate automatically for up to 10 hours following accidents to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory.

The licensee performed a retroactive look and concluded that even though no compensatory measures were enacted between August 16 and September 6, 2019, adequate wet cooling tower fans and dry cooling tower fans remained in service for the ultimate heat sink to perform its safety function.

**Corrective Actions:** The licensee's immediate corrective action was to perform an engineering calculation to evaluate the effects of ACC-126A cycling had on its ability to perform all design basis functions. The licensee's ongoing corrective actions include initiating a performance analysis to evaluate why all design basis functions were not considered when making operability determinations for ACC-126A and to determine any future actions necessary to ensure all design basis functions are considered when performing future operability determinations.

**Corrective Action References:** CR-WF3-2019-06698, CR-WF3-2019-07024, CR-WF3-2019-07164

**Performance Assessment:**

**Performance Deficiency:** The failure to consider all the impacted safety functions of ACC-126A when assessing its operability in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determination Process," was a performance deficiency.

**Screening:** The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the impact of ACC-126A oscillating despite a closed demand from its controller. As a result, ACC-126A was relied on to perform its safety function to automatically modulate closed to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory when it was unable to do so, reducing the design margin of the ultimate heat sink water inventory by approximately 25 percent. In addition, since compensatory measures needed to maintain the ultimate heat sink operable were not implemented, had the licensee taken fans out of service as allowed by technical specifications, the ultimate heat sink would have been inoperable and unable to perform its safety function for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time.

**Significance:** The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low risk significance (Green) because the structure, system, and component maintained operability.

**Cross-Cutting Aspect:** H.6 - Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not

consider the impact modulation of ACC-126A would have on the ultimate heat sink water inventory margin, or identify the resulting 25 percent decrease in margin, until questioned by the inspectors.

Enforcement:

Violation: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, on August 16, 2019, the licensee did not accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with procedures. Specifically, when a degraded condition was discovered associated with ACC-126A, the licensee did not determine the impact of the degraded condition on the ability of ACC-126A to perform its safety function to automatically operate for up to 10 hours following a design basis accident to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory, as required by Step 8.2 of Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determination Process," Revision 16.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation

71114.04

This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) states, in part, that a licensee shall submit to the NRC a report of each change to its emergency plan, including a summary of its analysis, within 30 days after the change is put in effect. Contrary to the above, Waterford 3 failed to submit to the NRC a report of two changes made to its Emergency Plan within 30 days after the changes were put in effect. Specifically, between November 2015 and November 2019, Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 49, was put into effect May 21, 2019, and a report of the change was made to the NRC on November 14, 2019. Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 50, was put into effect September 9, 2019, and a report of the change was made to the NRC on November 30, 2019. In addition, the licensee submitted Emergency Plan, Revision 47 (dated December 10, 2016), EPP-01-001, Emergency Classification, Revisions 31 (dated September 29, 2015) and 33 (dated May 31, 2018), and the Evacuation Time Estimate Study, Revision 1 (dated November 30, 2012) to the NRC on November 14, 2019. The inspectors determined that Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revisions 49 and 50, did not reduce the effectiveness of the site emergency plan.

Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The violation is a failure to comply with NRC requirements which is not associated with the classification of emergencies or notification of emergency conditions to offsite agencies.

Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2019-08488

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On December 16, 2019, the inspectors presented the exit meeting for the 2019 Emergency Preparedness Exercise inspection results to Mr. S. Vazquez, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On January 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. S. Vazquez, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.04Q	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2019-08086, 2019-08111, 2019-08173, 2019-08207, 2019-08210, 2019-08219	
71111.04Q	Procedures	OP-002-003	Component Cooling Water	319
71111.04Q	Procedures	OP-009-002	Emergency Diesel Generator	351
71111.04Q	Procedures	OP-009-003	Emergency Feedwater	309
71111.05Q	Miscellaneous	CT1-001	Dry Cooling Tower "A"	7
71111.05Q	Miscellaneous	RAB 11-001	Battery Room "3B"	7
71111.05Q	Miscellaneous	RAB 1E-001	Cable Vault	10
71111.05Q	Miscellaneous	RAB 40-001	Diesel Oil Storage Tank "A"	5
71111.11Q	Procedures	EN-OPS-115	Conduct of Operations	26
71111.11Q	Procedures	OI-042-000	Operating Instructions Watch Processes	61
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2017-01098, 2018-02871, 2018-04139, 2018-05221, 2019-02702, 2019-03144, 2019-05823, 2019-08054, 2019-06162, 2019-06698, 2019-07164, 2019-08095, 2019-08126, 2019-08127, 2019-08009, 2019-08184, 2019-08187	
71111.12	Miscellaneous	EC-83893	Cycle 22, Refuel 22 Maintenance Rule (A)(3) Periodic Assessment	0
71111.12	Procedures	EN-DC-203	Maintenance Rule Program	4
71111.12	Procedures	EN-DC-204	Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis	4
71111.12	Procedures	EN-DC-205	Maintenance Rule Monitoring	7
71111.12	Procedures	EN-DC-206	Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Process	3
71111.12	Procedures	EN-DC-207	Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment	3
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2019-08031, 2019-08002, 2019-08001, 2019-07833	
71111.13	Procedures	EN-WM-104	On Line Risk Assessment	21
71111.13	Procedures	OI-037-000	Operations Risk Assessment Guideline	314
71111.13	Work Orders		52810798, 52822009	
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2019-07716, 2019-07996, 2019-07998, 2019-08002, 2019-08086, 2019-07343, 2019-02217, 2019-05832, 2019-05877, 2019-06162, 2019-06698, 2019-06759, 2019-07024, 2019-07043, 2019-07044, 2019-07055,	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			2019-07164, 2019-07167, 2019-07752, 2019-07833, 2019-08184, 2019-08187, 2019-04868, 2019-08198	
71111.15	Drawings	1564-2171	Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence CWD, Sheet 1	28
71111.15	Drawings	1564-2173	Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence CWD, Sheet 3	11
71111.15	Drawings	1564-2174	Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence Description, SHT	7
71111.15	Drawings	1564-2175	Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence Description SHT	6
71111.15	Drawings	1564-2182	Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Shutdown & Alarm Sys CWD & CONN	18
71111.15	Miscellaneous	EC-38218	Provide Engineering Input for CR-WF3-2012-2870 - ACC-126A(B) Leak criteria	0
71111.15	Procedures	EN-OP-104	Operability Determination Process	16
71111.15	Procedures	EP-002-100	Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation, Operation, and Deactivation	50
71111.15	Procedures	OP-901-511	Instrument Air Malfunction	17
71111.15	Procedures	OP-903-118	Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests	47
71111.19	Procedures	ME-004-155	Reactor Trip Switchgear	309
71111.19	Procedures	OP-903-050	Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump and Valve	42
71111.19	Procedures	OP-903-068	Emergency Diesel Generator and Subgroup Relay Operability Verification	325
71111.19	Procedures	OP-903-127	Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Post-Maintenance Retest	309
71111.19	Work Orders		52782214, 52830113	
71111.22	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2019-07950	
71111.22	Procedures	OP-903-035	Containment Spray Pump Operability Check	32
71111.22	Procedures	OP-903-050	Component Cooling Water & Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump and Valve Operability Test	41
71111.22	Procedures	OP-903-100	MOV Overload Bypass Test	311
71111.22	Work Orders		52890248, 52823091	
71114.01	Corrective Action	CR-WF3-YYYY-	2013-05860, 2018-01956, 2018-02988, 2018-03815,	



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	Documents	NNNN	2018-03842, 2018-04416, 2018-06293, 2018-06590, 2018-06331, 2019-04355, 2019-05722, 2019-06141, 2019-06195, 2019-06196, 2019-06197, 2019-06198, 2019-06199, 2019-06431, 2019-06444, 2019-08488, 2019-08602, 2019-08611, 2019-08612, 2019-08638, 2019-08640, 2019-08643, 2019-08644	
71114.01	Engineering Changes	EC78595	Plant Paging System Upgrade	11/14/2019
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the Orange Team NRC Dress Rehearsal	9/25/2019
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the HP Drill	6/30/2019
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the Red Team Site Drill	4/30/2019
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the Blue Team Training Drill	4/3/2019
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the ERO Red Team Site Drill	8/29/2018
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the ERO Green Team Site Drill	6/20/2018
71114.01	Miscellaneous		After-Action Report for the ERO Orange Team Site Drill	2/21/20158
71114.01	Miscellaneous	Attachment 9.2, 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screening, Procedure/Document Number: EP-001-001, Revision: 33	Recognition & Classification of Emergency Conditions	4/26/2018
71114.01	Miscellaneous	Attachment 9.3, 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Evaluation, Procedure/Document Number: EP-001-001, Revision: 33	Recognition & Classification of Emergency Conditions	4/26/2018
71114.01	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2019-0081	Emergency Preparedness Historical Documents	11/14/2019
71114.01	Procedures		After-Action Report for the ERO Blue Team Site Drill	12/6/2018
71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-610	TSC Operations	8
71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-611	OSC Operations, Attachment 1, OSC Manager	11/20/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-611	OSC Operations, Attachment 2, OSC Operations Support	11/20/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-611	OSC Operations, Attachment 3, Work Control Coordinator	11/20/2019

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71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-611	OSC Operations, Attachment 4, Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Coordinators	11/20/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-611	OSC Operations, Attachment 5, Rad/Chem Coordinator	11/20/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EN-EP-611	OSC Operations, Attachment 6, OSC Log Keeper	11/20/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EN-IS-123	Electrical Safety	21
71114.01	Procedures	EN-LI-102	Corrective Action Program, R38	9/6/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EN-RP-505	PortaCount Respirator Fit Testing, Revision 7	12/10/15
71114.01	Procedures	EP-001-001	Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions	33
71114.01	Procedures	EP-001-010	Unusual Event, R307	2/12/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-001-020	Alert, R310	2/12/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-001-030	Site Area Emergency, R309	2/12/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-001-040	General Emergency, R310	2/12/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-010	Notifications and Communications, R316	4/15/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-015	Emergency Responder Notification, R304	4/25/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-030	Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Controls	10
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-031	In-Plant Radiological Controls and Surveys During Emergencies, R302	9/14/2016
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-034	Onsite Surveys during Emergencies	302
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-050	Offsite Dose Assessment, R308	8/13/2018
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-052	Protective Action Guidelines, R26	4/25/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-071	Site Protective Measures, R303	11/25/2015
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-090	Core Damage Assessment, R303	12/19/2016
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-100	Technical Support Center Activation, Operation, and Deactivation, R50	5/19/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-101	Operations Support Center Activation, Operation, and Deactivation, R308	7/26/2017
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-102	Emergency Operations Facility Activation, Operation, and Deactivation, R310	2/12/2019
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-130	Emergency Team Assignments, R24	12/19/2016
71114.01	Procedures	EP-002-190	Personnel Accountability, R22,	9/12/2018
71114.01	Procedures	EP-003-020	Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises, R304	12/19/2016
71114.01	Procedures	EPP-428	Equipment Important to Emergency Response	307
71114.01	Procedures	ME-004-463	Paging System	11

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71114.01	Work Orders	Work Order Number	505131	
71114.04	Miscellaneous		50.54(Q)(2) Review for EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines, Revision 26	4/24/2019
71114.04	Procedures	EP-003-070	Emergency Preparedness Routine Tests and Checks, R306	2/5/2019
71114.06	Procedures	WSIM-LOR-196SIM1	2019 Cycle 6 Practice 1	0
71151	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2018-02870, 2018-03784, 2019-05429, 2018-05551, 2018-05591, 2018-05882, 2018-06295, 2018-07075, 2019-03286, 2019-04005, 2019-06327, 2019-04355, 2019-04362, 2019-05344, 2019-06325, 2019-07034, 2019-07528	
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2019-0003	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 4th Quarter 2018 ROP Data	01/10/2019
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2019-0030	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 1st Quarter ROP Data	04/11/2019
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2019-0075	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 3rd Quarter ROP Data	10/17/2019
71151	Procedures	EN-FAP-EP-005	Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators	9
71151	Procedures	EN-FAP-OM-005	Nuclear Performance Indicator Program	8
71151	Procedures	EN-LI-114	Regulatory Performance Indicator Process	17
71151	Procedures	EPP-422	Siren and Helicopter Warning System Maintenance	12
71151	Procedures	EPP-424	Siren Testing and Siren System Administrative Controls	20
71152	Calculations	19-WF3-0025	Boric Acid Leakage Identification Evaluation	08/04/2019
71152	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2019-06358, 2019-06379, 2019-06384, 2019-06415, 2019-06448, WT-WTWF3-2019-00018	
71152	Work Orders		529149	