

GENERAL EMERGENCY										SITE AREA EMERGENCY										ALERT										UNUSUAL EVENT																													
R	1	Rad Effluent	RG1 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE <div>123456NM</div>										RS1 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE <div>123456NM</div>										RA1 Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE <div>123456NM</div>										RU1 Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the SLC limits for 60 minutes or longer <div>123456NM</div>																										
			RG1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column "GE" for ≥ 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) RG1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) RG1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: • Closed window dose rates > 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for ≥ 60 min. • Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE > 5,000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. (Notes 1, 2)										RS1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column "SAE" for ≥ 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) RS1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) RS1.3 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: • Closed window dose rates > 100 mR/hr expected to continue for ≥ 60 min. • Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE > 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. (Notes 1, 2)										RA1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column "ALERT" for ≥ 15 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) RA1.2 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 4) RA1.3 Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses > 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Notes 1, 2) RA1.4 Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY: • Closed window dose rates > 10 mR/hr expected to continue for ≥ 60 min. • Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE > 50 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation. (Notes 1, 2)										RU1.1 Reading on any Table R-1 effluent radiation monitor > column "UE" for ≥ 60 min. (Notes 1, 2, 3) RU1.2 Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 x SLC limits for ≥ 60 min. (Notes 1, 2)																										
			RG2 Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least the top of the fuel racks for 60 minutes or longer <div>123456NM</div> RG2.1 Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to > 25 ft. (746 ft. ele.) (KFP5350 or NVP6530) for ≥ 60 min. (Note 1)										RS2 Spent fuel pool level at the top of the fuel racks <div>123456NM</div> RS2.1 Spent fuel pool level ≤ 25 ft. (746 ft. ele.) (KFP5350 or NVP6530)										RA2 Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel <div>123456NM</div> RA2.1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY RA2.2 Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity AND A Trip 2 radiation alarm on any of the following radiation monitor indications: • 1EMF17 (2EMF4) Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge • 1EMF16 (2EMF3) Containment Building Refueling Bridge (Mode 6) • 1EMF42 (2EMF42) Fuel Building Ventilation • 1EMF39 (2EMF39) Containment Gas RA2.3 Spent fuel pool level ≤ -15 ft. (756 ft. ele.) (KFP5350 or NVP6530)										RU2 Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel <div>123456NM</div> RU2.1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by low water level alarm or indication AND UNPLANNED rise in corresponding area radiation levels as indicated by EITHER of the following radiation monitors: • 1EMF17 (2EMF4) Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge • 1EMF16 (2EMF3) Containment Building Refueling Bridge (Mode 6)																										
Abnorm. Rad Levels / Rad Effluent	2	Irradiated Fuel Event	<div>Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds</div>										<div>Table R-2 Safe Operation &amp; Shutdown Rooms/Areas</div>																																														
3	Area Rad Levels																																																										
1	Security	None										HS1 HOSTILE ACTION within the Protected Area <div>123456NM</div> HS1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor										HA1 HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes <div>123456NM</div> HA1.1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor HA1.2 A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site										HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat <div>123456NM</div> HU1.1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by Security Shift Supervisor HU1.2 Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site HU1.3 A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat																											
		NOTES Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit. Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes. Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALs RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required. Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. Note 8: A manual trip action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. Note 9: In the absence of reliable NCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on the NCS pressure increase criteria when in Mode 5 or based on time to boil data when in Mode 6. Note 10: If the loss of containment cooling threshold is exceeded due to loss of both trains of VX-CARF, this EAL only applies if at least one train of VX-CARF is not operating, per design, after the 10 minute actuation delay for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted. Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.										None										[Refer to EAL CA6.1 OR SA8.1 for escalation due to seismic event]										HU2 Seismic event greater than OBE levels <div>123456NM</div> HU2.1 Seismic event > OBE as indicated by OBE EXCEEDED alarm on 1AD-13, E7																											
2	Seismic Event																																																										
3	Natural or Tech. Hazard																																																										
H	4	Fire																																																									
5	Hazardous Gases	<div>Table E-1 Safe Operation &amp; Shutdown Rooms/Areas</div>																																																									
6	Control Room Evacuation	<div>HS6 Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room <div>123456NM</div> HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels or Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) AND Control of any of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 min. (Note 1): • Reactivity (Modes 1, 2, and 3 only) • Core Cooling • NCS heat removal</div>										HS6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels or Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)										HA6.1 An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels or Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)										None																											
7	EC Judgment	HG7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a General Emergency <div>123456NM</div> HG7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area										HS7 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency <div>123456NM</div> HS7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that would lead to the likely failure of, or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.										HA7 Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert <div>123456NM</div> HA7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.										HU7 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE <div>123456NM</div> HU7.1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs.																											
		E	ISFSI	<div>Table E-1 ISFSI Dose Limits</div>																																																							

GENERAL EMERGENCY										SITE AREA EMERGENCY										ALERT										UNUSUAL EVENT											
1	Loss of Essential AC Power	SG1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to essential buses <div>1234</div>										SS1 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer <div>1234</div>										SA1 Loss of all but one AC power source to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer <div>1234</div>										SU1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer <div>1234</div>									
		SG1.1 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power capability to essential 4160V buses 1(2)ETA and 1(2)ETB AND EITHER: • Restoration of at least one essential bus in < 4 hours is not likely (Note 1) • Core Cooling RED PATH conditions met SG1 Loss of all essential AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer <div>1234</div>										SS1.1 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power capability to essential 4160V buses 1(2)ETA and 1(2)ETB for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1) AND SS2 Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer <div>1234</div>										SA1.1 AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses 1(2)ETA and 1(2)ETB reduced to a single power source for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1) AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS <div>Table S-1 AC Power Sources Offsite • ATC (Train A) • SATA (Train A) • ATD (Train B) • SATB (Train B) Onsite • D/G 1(2) A (Train A) • D/G 1(2) B (Train B)</div>										SU1.1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability, Table S-1, to essential 4160V buses 1(2)ETA and 1(2)ETB for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1) <div>None</div>									
		SG1.2 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power capability to essential 4160V buses 1(2)ETA and 1(2)ETB for ≥ 15 min. AND Loss of all 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC buses EVDA and EVDD for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1)										SS2.1 Loss of all 125 VDC power based on battery bus voltage indications < 105 VDC on both vital DC buses EVDA and EVDD for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1)										SA3 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress <div>1234</div>										SU3 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer <div>1234</div>									
3	Loss of CR Indications	None										<div>Table S-3 Significant Transients</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Reactor trip</li><li>Runback &gt; 25% thermal power</li><li>Electrical load rejection &gt; 25% electrical load</li><li>Safety injection actuation</li></ul>										SA3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1) AND Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-3 <div>Table S-2 Safety System Parameters</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Reactor power</li><li>NCS level</li><li>NCS pressure</li><li>Core exit T/C temperature</li><li>Level in at least one S/G</li><li>Auxiliary feed flow in at least one S/G</li></ul>										SU3.1 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more Table S-2 parameters from within the Control Room for ≥ 15 min. (Note 1)									
4	NCS Activity	None										None										SU4 NCS activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits <div>1234</div>																			
5	NCS Leakage	None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
6	RPS Failure	None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
7	Loss of Comm.	None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
8	CMT Failure	None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
9	Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems	None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
F	Fission Product Barriers	FG1.1 <div>1234</div> Loss of any two barriers AND Loss OR potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1)										FS1.1 <div>1234</div> Loss OR potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1)										FA1.1 <div>1234</div> Any loss OR any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or NCS (Table F-1)										Time After S/D (Hrs) NCS Loss FC Loss CMT Potential Loss 0-1 8.8 550 5500 1-2 8.4 400 4000 2-8 7.0 160 1600 >8 6.2 100 1000									
		None										None										None																			
		None										None										None																			
<div>NOTES</div> <div>Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.</div> <div>Note 2: If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time limit.</div> <div>Note 3: If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped, indicating that the release path is isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes.</div> <div>Note 4: The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EALS RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.</div> <div>Note 5: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.</div> <div>Note 6: If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency is not required.</div> <div>Note 7: This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.</div> <div>Note 8: A manual trip action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.</div> <div>Note 9: In the absence of reliable NCS temperature indication caused by the loss of decay heat removal capability, classification should be based on the NCS pressure increase criteria when in Mode 5 or based on time to boil data when in Mode 6.</div> <div>Note 10: If the loss of containment cooling threshold is exceeded due to loss of both trains of VV-CARF, this EAL only applies if at least one train of VV-CARF is not operating, per design, after the 10 minute actuation delay for greater than or equal to 15 minutes.</div> <div>Note 11: If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, then this emergency classification is not warranted.</div> <div>Note 12: If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification is not warranted.</div>																																									

Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix									
Category	Fuel Clad (FC) Barrier		Reactor Coolant System (NCS) Barrier		Containment (CMT) Barrier				
	Loss	Potential Loss	Loss	Potential Loss	Loss	Potential Loss			
A. NCS or SG Tube Leakage	None	None	1. An automatic or manual ECCS (SI) operation required by EITHER: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>UNISOLABLE NCS leakage</li><li>SG tube RUPTURE</li></ul>	1. Operation of a standby charging pump is required by EITHER: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>UNISOLABLE NCS leakage</li><li>SG tube leakage</li></ul> 2. Integrity-RED PATH conditions met	1. A leaking or RUPTURED SG is FAULTED outside of containment	None			
B. Inadequate Heat Removal	1. Core Cooling-RED PATH conditions met	1. Core Cooling-ORANGE PATH conditions met  2. Heat Sink-RED PATH conditions met AND Heat Sink is required	None	1. Heat Sink-RED PATH conditions met AND Heat Sink is required	None	1. Core Cooling-RED PATH conditions met AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. (Note 1)			
C. CMT Radiation / NCS Activity	1. EMF51A/B > Table F-2 column "FC Loss" 2. Dose equivalent I-131 coolant activity > 300 µCi/gm	None	1. EMF51A/B > Table F-2 column "NCS Loss"	None	None	1. EMF51A/B > Table F-2 column "CMT Potential Loss"			
D. CMT Integrity or Bypass	None	None	None	None	1. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Containment integrity has been lost based on EC judgment</li><li>UNISOLABLE pathway from Containment to the environment exists</li></ul> 2. Indications of NCS leakage outside of containment	1. Containment-RED PATH conditions met 2. Containment hydrogen concentration > 6% 3. Containment pressure > 3 psig with EITHER a failure of both trains of NS OR failure of both trains of VV-CARF for ≥ 15 min. (Notes 1, 10)			
E. EC Judgment	1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the fuel clad barrier	1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the fuel clad barrier	1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the NCS barrier	1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the NCS barrier	1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the containment barrier	1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the containment barrier			

EAL- HOT MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4



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