

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK:

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1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONT

0	1
2	3

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 1 0 1 7 8 0 8 1 1 0 8 8 2 9

DOCKET NUMBER 65 61 66 69 74 75 80

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 With unit 1 at hot shutdown and unit 2 at full power, the high steam flow

013 setpoints were determined to be greater than the Tech. Specs. limits. This event

014 is contrary to T.S. 3.7.B Table 3.7.1 and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b(2). The

015 redundant safety injection signals were available and steam line break protection

016 was provided by low pressurizer pressure SI actuation, therefore, the health and

017 safety of the public were not affected.

018	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE		
09	I B	D	Z	I N S T R U	19	Z		
7 8 9	9 10	11	12	13 14 15 16 17 18	19	20		
17	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.			
LER/RD REPORT NUMBER	8 2	1 0 9	0 3	L	0			
21 22	23	24 25 26	27 28 29	30 31	32			
ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	Z	Z 9 9 9
33 34	35	36	37	38 39 40	41	42	43	44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this event was an error in the original calculations to set the

1 1 voltage for calibrating the steam flow instrumentation. The correct voltages

1 2 were calculated, the instruments were recalibrated, and the calibration procedures

1 3 changed to reflect the new valves.

1 4
7 8 9
FACILITY STATUS
1 5
7 8 9
G (28)
10 11 12
0 0 0 (29)
13
N/A (30)
METHOD OF DISCOVERY
1 5
7 8 9
A (31)
10 11 12
LER Investigation (32)
13
ACTIVITY CONTENT
1 6
7 8 9
Z (33)
10 11 12
Z (34)
13
N/A (35)
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
1 6
7 8 9
Z (33)
10 11 12
Z (34)
13
N/A (36)
LOCATION OF RELEASE
1 7
7 8 9
0 0 0 (37)
10 11 12
Z (38)
13
N/A (39)
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
1 7
7 8 9
0 0 0 (37)
10 11 12
Z (38)
13
N/A (39)
PERSONNEL INJURIES
1 8
7 8 9
0 0 0 (40)
10 11 12
N/A (41)
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
1 9
7 8 9
Z (42)
10 11 12
N/A (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION

7 8 9 10
PUBLICATION (45)
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (44)
2 0 N (44)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8211220244 821108
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR
NRC USE ONLY
68 69

NAME OF DEFENDANT J. L. Wilson

BUFILE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 and 2

DOCKET NO: 50-280

REPORT NO: 82-109/03L-G

EVENT DATE: 10-17-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: STEAM FLOW SETPOINTS > T.S.

1. Description of the Event:

With unit 1 at hot shutdown and unit 2 at full power, the high steam flow setpoints were determined to be 0.78% greater than the Tech. Spec. limits at 100% power, and 3.4% above the Tech. Spec. limits at hot shutdown. This potential problem was discovered during the investigation for unit 2 LER-82-46, (FC-2-485 Failed). The specific deviation from Tech. Spec. was calculated in Engineering Study 82-70.

This event is contrary to T.S. 3.7.B, table 3.7.1 and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment:

Each steam line is provided with two steam flow channels. High steam flow on 1/2 channels, for 2/3 steamlines, coincident with low steam line pressure or low Tave, will initiate safety injection to mitigate the effects of a main steam line break.

All redundant initiation signals for safety injection (SI) were available. The high steam flow SI was demonstrated functional by several spurious high steam flow SI's. Protection against a steam line break accident is also provided by low pressurizer pressure actuating safety injection, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of the Event:

The cause of this event was an error in the original calculations to set the voltages for calibrating the steam flow instrumentation. The steam pressure input used in the calculations was assumed to be constant, however, steam pressure varies with power.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Engineering Study 82-70 was implemented to determine the extent of the error and the best way to correct it.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The steam flow setpoints were adjusted to eliminate the error calculated in the Engineering Study.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

An investigation on the steam flow corrected setpoints of other protection functions are being reviewed.

7. Generic Implications:

Changes were required for Surry Unit 1 and Unit 2.