

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

November 11, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 82-023

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-023 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.7.6, "Control Room Normal and Emergency Air Handling System," on October 14, 1982.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

ARK:OWD:dwf  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer  
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#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 14, 1982, with the Plant in Mode 3, it was discovered that excessive air was leaking from the air pressure regulator for the "B" Train Control Room Ventilation System outside air damper. The system, which is required to be operational per Technical Specification 3.7.6, was declared inoperable for repairs.

#### PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

There was no adverse consequences since a redundant Control Room Ventilation System was OPERABLE. Also, with the Plant in Mode 3 during initial plant start-up, no radioactive inventory existed.

#### CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to a ruptured diaphragm in the pressure regulator.

#### IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

The immediate corrective action was to replace the ruptured diaphragm with a new one. The system was declared OPERABLE per applicable Surveillance Test Procedure on October 14, 1982.

#### ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The licensee plans no further action for this event as it appears to be an isolated occurrence.