

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES																																																																															

Technical Specification 3.7.2 requires the control room emergency filtration system train to be operable. On October 10, 1982 while in mode 2 the "OB" VC train could not maintain the required .125 inches of water positive pressure relative to the adjacent areas. Later that day the Reactor Mode Switch was moved to the run position. The health and safety of plant personnel was maintained at all times since the redundant "A" VC train was available to maintain the required positive pressure.

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE																																																																	
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11		12		13		14						15		16																																																																	
EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.																																																																							
8 2		1 1 9		0 3		L		0																																																																							
21		24		28		30		32																																																																							
ACTION TAKEN		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NRC FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																																																																	
A		Z		Z		0 0 0 0		Y		N		A		Z 9 9 9																																																																	
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS																																																																															

The inlet ductwork was blocked by a loose louver blade and several manual dampers were not in their original position. The loose louver blade was repaired and the manual dampers were restored to their original position. All shift engineers have been informed not to change modes under this Technical Specification.

FACILITY STATUS		POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
B		0 0 0		NA		A		INDICATION	
28		29		30		31		32	
ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE			
Z		Z		NA		NA			
33		34		35		36			
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
0 0 0		Z		na					
37		38		39					
PERSONNEL INJURIES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
0 0 0		Z		NA					
40		41		42					
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
Z		Z		NA					
42		43		44					
PUBICITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
N		N		NA					
44		45		46					
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		PDR					
N		N		S					
44		45		46					
NAME OF PREPARER		K. Wittenburg		PHONE					
8		9		357-6761					

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PDR ADOCK 05000373
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NRC USE ONLY

- I. LER NUMBER: 82-119/03L-0
- II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit 1
- III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373
- IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Technical Specification 3.7.2. requires that the control room emergency filtration system train shall be operable in all operational conditions. On October 10, 1982 at 1200 hours during Startup mode, the "OB" VC train could not maintain .125 inches of water positive pressure relative to the adjacent areas as required by Technical Specification 4.7.2.d.3.

Technical Specification 3.0.4. states that entry into an operational condition shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the Action requirements. At 1845 hours on October 10, 1982 the Reactor Mode Switch was moved to the run position.

- V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The health and safety of plant personnel was maintained at all times since the redundant "A" VC train was available to maintain the required positive pressure and no hazardous releases occurred.

- VI. CAUSE:

The Mechanical Maintenance group found that one of the lower blades had come loose and was blocking the inlet ductwork. The operating department found that several of the manual dampers were not in their original positions.

With regard to the changing of modes, the shift engineer failed to recognize that the technical specifications precluded changing modes under the action item concerning the control room ventilation.

- VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The "A" Train was used to maintain the .125 inch positive pressure in the Control Room. To regain the required positive pressure from the "B" control room ventilation system, the operating department repositioned several dampers to their original positions. In addition the broken louver was repaired.

Each shift engineer was informed by an operating engineer as to the oversight involving changing the mode switch.

Prepared by: Kermit C. Wittenburg