




KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

November 5, 1982

Mr. W.C. Seidle, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011



KMLNRC 82-251
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482
Subj: Final 10CFR50.55(e) Report - Suspect
Potentiometer Leads on Foxboro Cards

Dear Mr. Seidle:

This letter provides the final report concerning suspect potentiometer leads on Foxboro cards. Kansas Gas and Electric Company initially reported this matter to Region IV of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on October 8, 1982. Additional information was provided to Mr. Johnson, NRC Region IV, on October 12, 1982.

The attached Final Report is submitted pursuant to Regulation 10CFR50.55(e). If you have any questions concerning this subject, please contact me or Mr. Otto Maynard of my staff.

Yours very truly,

Glenn L. Koester

GLK:bb
Attach

cc: Messrs. TVandel/SSchum, w/a

8211150589 821105
PDR ADOCK 05000482
S PDR

IE 27

10CFR50.55(e) FINAL REPORT

On

SUSPECT POTENTIOMETER LEADS

For

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

November 5, 1982

I. INTRODUCTION

The Foxboro Company recently advised Kansas Gas and Electric Company that a potential deficiency may exist in certain cards or modules supplied to Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS). The suspect component is a one K ohm potentiometer utilized to set the alarm point or gap for alarms. The advisory described in detail the method of ferreting out the suspect parts.

Instrumentation and Control personnel at Wolf Creek Generating Station commenced a thorough investigation to determine whether or not any of the suspect units had been supplied to WCGS. The investigation involved the removal of all cards of the suspect types, one at a time, from all plant Foxboro racks and checking for the suspect potentiometers. Cards in warehouse spare parts were also checked.

The investigation revealed that 11 out of 158 cards contained the suspect potentiometer. Some of the suspect cards were installed in safety-related equipment.

II. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

Foxboro's advisory stated that factory tests and evaluation revealed that components utilized during the period December, 1980, to December, 1981, may have been subjected to mechanical stress during assembly. This stress could have, in some cases, created a fracture of the leads to resistive element connection. This condition could, with subsequent stress due to temperature variations, vibration or additional mechanical stress due to setting adjustments; cause an intermittent open or short to occur.

III. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Due to the nature of the potential defect it would be difficult to find the actual faults, if any, and it may take several years of operation before any adverse performance would be observed. The cards are used in

several applications including safety-related equipment. Therefore, rather than performing a safety analysis, the conservative assumption was made that all suspect potentiometers were faulty and could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant. Therefore, this matter is reportable under Regulation 10CFR50.55(e).

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The eleven cards with the potentially defective potentiometers will be returned to the Foxboro Company for repair or replacement. It is anticipated that approximately three months will be required to complete the corrective action. In any event the corrective action will be completed prior to fuel load.