

## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /1/0/1/8/8/2/ (8) /1/1/0/2/8/2/ (9)  
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On October 18, 1982, while in Mode 1, the operability of off-site electrical pow-/  
/0/3/ / er sources was not verified prior to removing 2J Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)/  
/0/4/ / from service or within 1 hour thereafter contrary to T.S. 3.8.1.1.a. The redun-/  
/0/5/ / dant EDG (2H) was verified to be operable. Since the off-site power sources did /  
/0/6/ / remain operable during this time, although not properly verified, the health and /  
/0/7/ / safety of the public were not affected. This event is reportable pursuant to /  
/0/8/ / T. S. 6.9.1.9.c. /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE  
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /E/E/ (11) /A/ (12) /A/ (13) /G/E/N/E/R/A/ (14) /D/ (15) /Z/ (16)  
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION  
REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

(17) NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/6/8/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/  
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT  
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/H/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /F/0/1/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / This event was caused by personnel error and procedural inadequacy. The redund-/  
/1/1/ / ant EDG was verified to be operable as required by the procedure for EDG /  
/1/2/ / removal for maintenance (MOP-6.91).However the additional commitment to verify /  
/1/3/ / off-site power sources via the periodic test (2-PT-80) was overlooked . /  
/1/4/ / Personnel were reinstructed. /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / /A/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES  
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)  
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES  
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)  
TYPE DESCRIPTION  
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

/ / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

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PDR ADOCK 05000339  
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Virginia Electric and Power Company  
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-339  
Report No. IER 82-068/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 2

#### Description of Event

On October 18, 1982, while in Mode 1, 2J EDG was to be removed from service for annual preventative maintenance. The redundant EDG (2H) was operability tested in accordance with the procedure for removal of the 2J EDG from service. However, the verification of off-site power sources via the periodic test (2-PT-80) as required by the procedure was overlooked. The procedure references the surveillance requirements of T.S. 3.8.1.1 (Modes 1-4) and instructs the Operations personnel to implement the surveillance schedule which is an attachment to the procedure. However, the procedure format is potentially confusing in that items to be completed within 1 hour are not clearly identified. Since the off-site power sources were not verified as operable within one hour after the removal of 2J EDG from service, the Action Statement T.S. 3.8.1.1.a surveillance requirement (T.S. 4.8.1.1.1.a) was not met. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c.

#### Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The verification of off-site and on-site power sources ensures that there is an adequate power supply to safety related components during all phases of normal and transient conditions. Since the off-site power sources remained operable, although not properly verified within the required time frame, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

#### Cause of Event

This event was caused by personnel error and procedural inadequacy. The procedure for removing the EDG from service specifically referred to the surveillance requirements to be implemented and the time frame that must be met. However, the reference to completing the periodic test in order to comply with the surveillance is included in an attachment to the procedure rather than being stated in the body of the procedure.

#### Immediate Corrective Action

The verification of off-site power sources was performed immediately after the error was discovered. This was within 6 hours after removing the 2J EDG from service when the oncoming shift recognized the error. Personnel involved in the error were reinstructed.

Scheduled Corrective Action

Procedures for removing Emergency Diesel Generators from service will be revised to more clearly identify actions which must be completed within 1 hour.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

A copy of this report will be placed in the required reading file for all licensed operators.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications from this event.