

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

V A S P S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 31 CAT 32

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 0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 1 0 0 2 8 2 E 1 0 2 9 8 2 5  
 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 66 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 With Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown and the Overpressure Mitigating System in enable.  
 0 3 Both pressurizer PORV's (PCV 1455C and 1456) were declared inoperable. This is  
 0 4 contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.1.G.1.b(3) and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). A  
 0 5 bubble existed in the pressurizer and PCV-1456's instrument air supply remained  
 0 6 operational. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.  
 0 7  
 0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE C J 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE B 13 COMPONENT CODE V A L V O P 14 COMP. SUBCODE D 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16  
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 EVENT YEAR 8 2 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 1 0 6 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 REPORT TYPE L REVISION NO. 0  
 ACTION TAKEN A 18 G 19 FUTURE ACTION 7 20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD 0 0 0 0 HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRO-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 16 13 15 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 PCV-1455C was inoperable due to a leaking diaphragm and PCV-1456 was declared  
 1 1 inoperable due to low air pressure in it's back up bottle air supply. The  
 1 2 pressurizer level was reduced to 33% within 8 hours and the air bottles for  
 1 3 PCV-1456 were replaced.  
 1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS G 26 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation 32  
 1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36  
 1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39  
 1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41  
 1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43  
 2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION N/A 45

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ATTACHMENT 1  
SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1  
DOCKET NO: 50-280  
REPORT NO: 82-106/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 10-02-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: RCS OVERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown and the Overpressure Mitigating System in enable, PORV PCV-1455C was declared inoperable due to a leaking diaphragm and PORV PCV-1456 was declared inoperable due to a low air pressure in its backup air supply. This event is contrary to T.S.3.1.G.1.b.(3) and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The operability of the PORV's when RCS temp. is less than 350°F ensures that the reactor vessel will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.

A bubble existed in the pressurizer during the event which would have prevented a sudden overpressurization of the RCS and the level was reduced from 50% to less than 33%. Also the instrument air supply to PCV-1456 was operational and PT 2.26 (RCS PORV Test) verified the valve would cycle properly. Therefore, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. CAUSE:

PORV PCV 1455C was inoperable due to a leaking diaphragm. PCV-1456's back up bottled air supply had low air pressure which was due to a leak in a check valve between the bottled air supply and instrument air and a leak through a pressure gauge connection on the bottled air line.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The pressurizer level was reduced to 33% level within the 8 hour T.S. limit. The air bottles for PCV-1456 were replaced and the PORV was declared operable.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The RCS was depressurized and a PORV was opened, the PORVs were overhauled during the outage and the bottled air line check valve and pressure gauge were replaced.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The unit shutdown operating procedure will be revised to insure adequate air pressure exists in the PORV air bottles prior to placing the OPMS in service.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.