

CONTROL BLOCK.

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
6 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 1 0 1 6 8 2 8 1 0 2 9 8 6 9
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

With the unit at hot shutdown. The performance of TOP-100 disclosed, that valves 1-CS-116 and 1-CS-118 were closed. This is contrary to T.S. 3.4.A.5 and reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.a.(2). Analysis of the iodine removal capability was performed. The iodine removal capability, as analyzed, would have been sufficient to maintain the site boundary dose below the limit of 10CFR100. Since dose limits would not have been exceeded and the deficiency was identified and corrected promptly, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

SYSTEM CODE 9 S F 10 11 CAUSE CODE 11 A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 Z 13 COMPONENT CODE 13 V A L V E X 14 15 COMP. SUBCODE 15 E 16 VALVE SUBCODE 16 D 17
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 18 8 2 19 EVENT YEAR 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN 33 X 34 18 35 Z 36 19 37 20 38 21 39 22 40 23 41 24 42 25 43 26 44 27 45 28 46 29 47 30
FUTURE ACTION 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
EFFECT ON PLANT 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
HOURS 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 42 43 44 45 46 47
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 44 45 46 47
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

It has been determined that these valves were closed during leak test/troubleshooting of MOV-CS-102A and B during maintenance with the unit at cold shutdown. The valves were immediately opened. Management and procedural controls have been strengthened to ensure that this event is not repeated.

15 FACILITY STATUS 28 G 29 0 0 0 30 OTHER STATUS 30 N/A 31 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 A 32 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 Operational Event
16 ACTIVITY CONTENT 33 2 34 3 35 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 N/A 36 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 N/A
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 37 0 0 0 38 3 39 DESCRIPTION 39 N/A
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES 40 0 0 0 41 3 42 DESCRIPTION 41 N/A
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 2 44 3 45 DESCRIPTION 43 N/A
20 PUBLICITY 44 N 45 3 46 DESCRIPTION 45 N/A
21 ISSUED 44 N 45 3 46 DESCRIPTION 45 N/A

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NRC USE ONLY

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ATTACHMENT 1 (PAGE 1 OF 2)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-108/01T-0
EVENT DATE: 10-16-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Chemical Addition Flow Path Isolated

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With the unit at hot shutdown, the performance of TOP-1000 (RWST Special Sample Program) disclosed that valves 1-CS-116 and 1-CS-118 were closed. These valves are the chemical addition tank discharge valves to the containment spray pump suctions. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.4.A.5 and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.a.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The containment spray system is an engineered safeguards system comprised of spray rings, pumps, valves, tanks, and interconnecting piping. The chemical addition subsystem supplies NaOH from the chemical addition tank to the containment spray pump suctions. NaOH is used for: (1) ultimate sump pH (long term corrosion control and retention of iodine) and (2) to enhance the spray removal of radioactive iodine from the containment atmosphere. The performance of the containment spray system including the CAT tank level and automatic valves is displayed in the control room.

Closure of the subject valves did not affect the capability of the containment spray pumps to draw from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to perform the containment depressurization function. Observation and evaluation of control room indication would have resulted in the manual addition of the Chemical Addition Tank Volume thus assuring proper ultimate sump pH and long-term iodine retention.

Analysis of the iodine removal capability of the containment spray system was performed. Using the expected iodine partition coefficient for boric acid spray without NaOH addition, the site boundary dose limit of 10CFR100 would not have been exceeded.

Since established dose limits would not have been exceeded and the NaOH isolation was identified and corrected promptly, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

It has been determined that these valves were shut while leak test/troubleshooting of MOV-CS-102A and B. This testing was performed with the unit at cold shutdown. The scheduled valve lineup for the system was not performed prior to returning the unit to service.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Valves 1-CS-116 and 118 were immediately reopened and a complete system valve lineup was performed.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

ATTACHMENT 1 (PAGE 2 OF 2)
SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-108/01T-0
EVENT DATE: 10-16-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Chemical Addition Flow Path Isolated

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Valves 1-CS-116 and 118 were added to the Engineered Safeguards Valve Alignment Checklist. This checklist has been added to Operating Procedure (OP) 1.3, Unit Startup Procedure from 350/450 to Hot Shutdown, and has also been added to OP-1.4, Unit Startup Procedure from Hot Shutdown to 2% Power. Valve line ups for systems undergoing significant maintenance during an outage will be included in all future startup hold points.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.