Commonwealth Edison
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

October 29, 1982

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch #2
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: LaSalle County Station Unit 1
Proposed Amendment to NPF-11,
Change Request NPF-11/82-10
Supplemental Information
NRC Docket No. 50-373

References (a): C. W. Schroeder letter to A. Schwencer dated August 19, 1982.

(b): C. W. Schroeder letter to A. Schwencer dated October 22, 1982.

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Reference (a) provided Commonwealth Edison Company's original request for a change in Technical Specifications to allow installation of a modification to meet License NPF-11, Condition 2.C.(17). Following a telecon with Dr. A. Bournia, et al, Reference (b) was submitted. On October 26, 1982, Commonwealth Edison had an additional telecon with Dr. A. Bournia, et al, to discuss Reference (b). As a result of that telecon, the staff agreed to proceed with processing the license change request. It was requested, however, that the licensee document certain information as discussed on October 26, 1982. The purpose of this letter is to transmit to you the enclosed information.

If there are any further questions in this matter, please contact this office.

Enclosed for your use are one (1) signed original and thirty-nine (39) copies of this letter and the enclosure.

Very truly yours,

C W Schroeder 10/29/82

C. W. Schroeder
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

lm

cc: NRC Resident Inspector - LSCS

Enclosure

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ENCLOSURE

1. The pressure switches for the original installation are Static-O-Ring Model 5N procurred through the General Electric Company (San Jose) to IEEE 323-1971 standards. These switches are not qualified to NUREG 0588 standards yet, but they are included in the LaSalle Environmental Qualification program. (Note: They are not Barton Model 288A's as originally told to Dr. Bournia and his colleague, because of the diversity requirement on pressure sensing for the reactor vessel). These switches have qualification data on file at GE's plant in San Jose. For LOCA events inside containment these switches (located in the reactor building zone H4A) are not exposed to the LOCA environment. Similarly for a main steam line break, they are not exposed to that event. The HARSH environment events to which they could potentially be exposed are the feedwater line break or an instrument line break in the reactor building. Qualification test requirements are appropriately identified for these conditions. The seismic qualification of these instrument has been satisfactorily completed.

2. IEEE-279 requirements for physical and electrical separation of sensing and control and power channels pertinent to safety related systems are discussed in detail in FSAR Section 7.3.1.2 and subparagraphs. Specific conformance information for the ECCS's is provided in FSAR Section 7.3.2.1. The LPCI is analyzed for - 279 conformance in paragraph 7.3.2.1.2.3.1. The LPCS is analyzed for - 279 conformance in paragraph 7.3.2.1.2.3.2. The addition of the pressure interlock to protect the low pressure ECCS systems from an overpressure event utilized the same criteria as the original differential pressure permissive. The conclusions with respect to - 279 conformance remain unchanged. Only the principal ones are repeated here for emphasis: the single failure criteria are met from the multiple ECCS loops but not from individual ECCS's; physical and electrical separation criteria are met; test and calibration and bypass criteria are met; identification, repair, and readout criteria are also met. The design was made to reliably protect the piping systems from a potential overpressure event while retaining the reliability for positive ECCS injection on demand, either automatically or manually.

3. The ECCS water-injection lines each have a motor operated injection valve and a testable check valve on the reactor vessel side of this injection valve but inside primary containment. These check valves have open-closed indicating lights in the control room. Additionally now, with the low pressure ECCS interlock sensing tap placed on the injection piping between the motor operated valve and the testable check valve, the operation of the pressure switch can determine whether or not this segment of pipe is pressurized above the set pressure valve (500 $\pm$ 20 psia) due to check valve leakage. This would be an indirect indication; there is no dial or light signal for this pressure switch closure.