

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	A	L	B	R	F	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
8	9	LICENSEE CODE					14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57 CAT		58

VT

REPORT SOURCE: 1 8 L G 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 7 1 0 1 1 8 2 3 1 0 2 5 8 2 G  
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2] During performance of SI 4.5.A.1.C (Core Spray MOV Operability), test bypass valves

1] FCV-75-22 and FCV-75-50 did not meet the required closing time of 30 seconds

4] (T.S. 3.5.A). There was no effect on public health and safety. The valves

5] were closed and a caution order placed on them. Neither loop of core spray was

3] rendered inoperable. LPCI was available.

7] \_\_\_\_\_

4] \_\_\_\_\_

8 9

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SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
S	F	E	B	V	A	L	V	O	P	X	Q		
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20		
(17) LER RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.			
8		2		0		7		9		0			
21		22		23		24		25		26			
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED			
E		Z		Z		Z		0		Y			
32		33		34		35		36		37			
CAUSAL DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		REVISION NO.		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
(27)		Y		L		L		2		0			
41		42		43		44		45		46			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Variation in torque limit switch mechanism allowed the valve time to exceed the required time. Valve limit switches (Limitorque Corp) were set at exactly 30 seconds allowing no margin. The valves were administratively closed and the switches were adjusted on 10/15 and 10/16/82 to provide additional margin. This is a random event and no recurrence control is required.

FAMILY STATUS						N POWER						OTHER STATUS						METHOD OF DISCOVERY						DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION																													
E						100						NA						B						Surveillance test																													
ACTIVITY CONTENT																		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY																		LOCATION OF RELEASE																	
Z																		Z																		NA																	
PERSONNEL EXPOSED NUMBER																		TYPE																		DESCRIPTION																	
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COPIES OF INFORMATION TO FAMILY TYPE																		DEFERMENTS																																			
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NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARED BY B. Williamson

Page 6 (205) 720-0700

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82079 Technical Specification Involved 4.5.A.1.c

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(9) \* Date Due NRC 10/26/82

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were operating at 99.6-percent power; unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Units 2 and 3 were unaffected by this event. During performance of SI 4.5.A.1.c (Core Spray MOV Operability) test bypass valves FCV-75-22 and 75-50 did not meet the required closing time of 30 seconds (FSAR section 7.4.3.4.4 and the current safety analysis). In the unlikely event of an initiation signal during the test, some of the core spray flow could have been diverted from the vessel for a short period of time. This would not affect the integrated response of the core spray coolant system due to the conservations and margins to limits in the safety calculations; however, it did place the unit in an unanalyzed region of operation. The high-pressure coolant injection system (HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC), automatic depressurization system (ADS) and low-pressure coolant injection system (LPCI) were available. Procedures allow the valve stroke limit switches to be set within a 1% and (2-3%). They had originally been set at exactly 30 seconds, and the natural variation in the torque limit mechanism allowed the valve time to exceed the required time. The valves were closed and a caution order placed on the valves. This ensured proper core spray system response in the event of an initiation signal. A slight adjustment of the valve limit switches (Limitorque Corp) to provide additional margin was performed. The valves were successfully timed on October 15 and 16, 1982. This is a random event, and no additional recurrence control is necessary.

\* Previous Similar Events:

NONE

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

\*Revision: JRP