

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/9/2/6/8/2/ (8) /1/0/2/6/8/2/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On September 26, 1982 with the unit in Mode 1, the breaker for the Chemical Addi- /
/0/3/ / tion Tank Train A Discharge Valve, MOV-QS-202A, was found in the "Off" position. /
/0/4/ / Since the Train B Chemical Addition Tank Discharge Valve, MOV-QS-202B, was oper- /
/0/5/ / able during the time period that MOV-QS-202A was de-energized the health and /
/0/6/ / safety of the general public were not affected. This event is contrary to T.S. /
/0/7/ / 3.6.2.3 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
/0/8/ /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /S/C/ (11) /A/ (12) /A/ (13) /V/A/L/V/E/X/ (14) /E/ (15) /D/ (16)
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
REPORT NO. NO.
(17) NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/5/6/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
/H/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /C/6/6/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / MOV-QS-202A was inadvertently left in the de-energized condition because a pro- /
/1/1/ / cedure was not used when securing Quench Spray Pump 2-QS-P-1A on September 23, /
/1/2/ / 1982. The breaker was immediately energized and the personnel responsible for /
/1/3/ / failing to use the procedure were counselled. /
/1/4/ /

FACILITY METHOD OF
STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT

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Description of Event

On September 26, 1982, with the Unit in Mode 1, the breaker for the Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) Train A discharge valve, MOV-QS-202A, was found in the "OFF" position. It was subsequently determined that this valve had been de-energized on September 23, 1982, when Quench Spray Pump 2-QS-P-1A had been run on recirculation to insure complete mixing of boric acid and water in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Approximately 2500 gallons of water had been added to the RWST. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.6.2.3 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

The Chemical Addition Tank discharge valves isolate the CAT from the RWST and prevent sodium hydroxide from entering the RWST during normal operations. Since MOV-QS-202A receives an open signal 5 minutes after 2-QS-P-1A starts, whenever the pump is run for surveillance testing or RWST recirculation, procedure requires that MOV-QS-202A is de-energized by placing the breaker in the OFF position. The RWST can then be recirculated without discharging sodium hydroxide from the Chemical Addition Tank to the RWST.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The operability of the Chemical Addition System ensures that sufficient sodium hydroxide is added to the containment spray in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The sodium hydroxide solution enhances iodine removal from the containment atmosphere and maintains proper containment sump pH. During the time period that the train A CAT Discharge Valve, MOV-QS-202A, was de-energized, the train B CAT Discharge Valve, MOV-QS-202B, was operable to discharge sodium hydroxide to the containment depressurization systems in the event of a LOCA. In addition, emergency procedures require verification that these valves open in the event of a LOCA. Hence, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

MOV-QS-202A was inadvertently left in the de-energized condition because the procedure was not used when securing the pump.

Immediate Corrective Action

On September 26, 1982, MOV-QS-202A was found to be de-energized during the performance of the control board lamp test. The valve was immediately energized. Subsequently, the personnel responsible for this oversight were counselled to emphasize the severity of the error and the possible consequences of the failure to adhere to procedural controls.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action has been scheduled.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

This incident is being discussed with all Operations shift personnel during the annual requalification sessions. Emphasis is being placed on the use of procedures and the importance of correct log entries.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications from this event.