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Helping Build Mississippi
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October 26, 1982

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/L-334.0/L-350.0
Onsite Communication Systems
Response to NRC Concerns
AECM-82/509

Mississippi Power & Light (MP&L) submitted letters AECM-82/262 and AECM-82/459, dated June 10, 1982 and August 9, 1982, respectively, in response to NRC concerns regarding the adequacy of onsite communication systems. (See Operating License Condition 2.C(32) and section 9.6.1 of the Grand Gulf Safety Evaluation Report and its supplements for the NRC staff's review on this issue.)

Recent conversations with the Power Systems Branch (PSB) reviewer indicated the need for clarification or additional information. These items and the associated MP&L responses are provided below.

Item 1:

Additional information or a design modification is required to demonstrate adequate communication systems in the areas noted as exhibiting high ambient noise levels. (Reference: AECM-82/459, dated August 9, 1982.)

Response:

Based on discussions with the NRC on communication systems in the diesel generator rooms, MP&L agrees to make the appropriate design modification to provide effective communications with background noise levels associated with the engines running. Consistent with Operating License Condition 2.C(32), these modifications will be made prior to the startup from the first regularly scheduled refueling outage. The exact details of these modifications are not available at this time; however, it is anticipated that the existing PA system in the subject rooms will be upgraded. In the interim, PA handsets and 2-way radio communications are available outside the high noise area.

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With regard to the fire pump house, MP&L proposes that 2-way radio can be utilized effectively immediately outside the pump house thus providing reliable backup communications. It should be noted, as presented in response to NRC Question 040.40, the radio communication system is supplied from 120 vac, uninterruptible power. For this reason, MP&L contends no design changes are required for communication systems associated with the fire water pump house.

Item 2:

Clarify the use of 2-way radio systems.

Response:

As noted in MP&L's response to NRC Question 040.40, (FSAR, Amendment 55), MP&L contends that sound powered phones and 2-way portable radios provide backup communication capability.

It is intended that 2-way radio be used as backup throughout the plant with the exception of those areas which were identified in the MP&L evaluation of I & E Circular 80-09, "Problems with Plant Internal Communications System." Use of portable radios is prohibited in certain areas based on possible adverse effects on control instrumentation from the radio transmission. The use of hand held radios is administratively controlled by plant procedures.

Item 3:

MP&L provided in letter AECM-82/459, dated August 9, 1982, a listing of work stations requiring communications with the control room or remote shutdown panel in order to mitigate the consequences of transient and/or accidents. This listing (Table 1 of Attachment 1 to the referenced letter) is not complete and does not appear to include all areas requiring communications with the control room or shutdown panel. Specifically, ECCS pump rooms were not included in the subject listing.

Response:

It is MP&L's position that the information provided in the referenced letter constitutes an adequate response to this issue.

As stated in response to Concern 1 in Attachment 1 to the referenced letter, redundancy and diversity in the GGNS design result in a relatively low number of work stations requiring communication with the control room (or shutdown panel). MP&L offers that communications can certainly be advisable in certain situations (such as fires); however, the design of the plant provides a reliable means for safe shutdown and cooldown. The success of achieving this plant condition is independent of adequate communications, except as noted in Table 1 of the referenced letter.

The ECCS pump rooms, for example, were not included because there was no requirement to communicate with these areas, as determined by a review of plant emergency procedures. The ECCS network is, of course, fully safety

grade, and redundant. Because of this, communications with the potentially failed divisional pump room would not be necessary to safely shutdown the plant since the other divisions would be available.

Please advise if any additional information is required.

Yours truly,

L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

JGC/JDR:sap

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