


# VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION



RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301

2.C.2.1  
FVY 82-110

REPLY TO:  
ENGINEERING OFFICE

1671 WORCESTER ROAD  
FRAMINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 01701  
TELEPHONE 617-872-8100

October 12, 1982

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Mr. Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing

References: (a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)  
(b) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 82-72, dated June 16, 1982  
(c) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 82-73, dated May 10, 1982  
(d) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 82-52, dated May 10, 1982

Subject: Alternate Shutdown System

Dear Sir:

In Reference (b), we submitted additional information to the NRC with regard to our proposed Alternate Shutdown System. During a subsequent telecon on August 12, 1982, between NRC Staff and Vermont Yankee, Reference (b) was discussed. As a result of that telecon, it was determined that additional information would be necessary for your staff to complete their review of our submittal. The requested information is provided in Attachment I.

We trust that this information is satisfactory; however, should you have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to call us.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

*L. D. Marsolais*

L. D. Marsolais  
Project Manager

JBS/dd

*A001*

ATTACHMENT I

RESPONSE TO NRC TELECON REQUEST  
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Item 1

Assure that the cables for valve FCV 2-17 are routed totally separate from those for valve FCV 2-18.

Response

These are one-inch valves. The calculations on reactor level loss performed for development of this concept included a stuck primary relief valve case. The calculation showed sufficient time for the operator to get from the Control Room to the Reactor Building to open the control circuits. Since the relief valves are so much larger than the head vent, this calculation bounds an open vent valve case.

Therefore, no design action is needed for valves FCV2-17 and 18. If there is a fire and if hot shorts open both valves causing a reactor water loss, level decrease will not be significant by the time the operator opens the isolation switches. The Alternate Shutdown Procedure will require that the isolation switches of the control circuits of these valves be opened causing the valves to close.

Item 2

Assure that the cables for RHR valve V10-17 are routed totally separate from those for valve V10-18.

Response

The cables for RHR valves V10-17 and V10-18 are designated as different separation groups (System I and System II) and are routed in totally separate raceways. However, in those areas where cables run in close proximity of each other, suitable barriers will be provided.