



**GPU Nuclear**

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

September 16, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator  
Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b 3 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice President and Director  
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse  
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)  
Office of Management Information and  
Program Control  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-46/03L

Report Date

September 16, 1982

Occurrence Date

August 15, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

It was discovered that primary containment integrity was not maintained when the administrative controls keeping main steam line drain valves V-1-106, V-1-110, and V-1-111 deactivated and secured in the isolation position were defeated prior to the reactor coolant temperature going below 212°F. This exceeds a limiting condition for operation as outlined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.3.a.1.b.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.3.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was proceeding to a cold shutdown condition.

Major Plant Parameters

Reactor Power:	Subcritical
Generator Output:	0 MWe
Mode Switch Position:	REFUEL
Reactor Coolant Temperature:	390°F

Description of Occurrence

On May 27, 1982, the breakers for valves V-1-106, V-1-110, and V-1-111 were placed in the "OFF" position, tagged, and the control switches for each valve were also tagged in the "NORMAL" (closed) position. This was due to valve V-1-106 being declared inoperable (Reference: Reportable Occurrence 50-219/82-18/03L). These actions are required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.3.a.1.b.

During the plant shutdown on August 15, 1982, valves V-1-106, V-1-110 and V-1-111 were not maintained as "deactivated and secured" in the isolation position until the reactor coolant temperature was below 212°F. At approximately 11:00 AM in preparation for shutdown maintenance, the tags on the breakers were removed and the breakers returned to the "ON" position. Also, the tags on the valves' control switches were removed, and the Control Room operators were instructed not to operate the valves until reactor coolant temperature was less than 212°F. It was not until 4:40 that afternoon that reactor coolant temperature was brought below 212°F, leaving a period of 5 hours and 40 minutes during which the valves were not "deactivated and secured". It is important to note that during this time the valves remained in the isolated (closed) position.

#### Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause was attributed to personnel error. While the valves were maintained in a closed position, the deactivation requirement of the Technical Specifications was overlooked.

#### Analysis of Occurrence

The Technical Specifications require that a primary containment penetration, with an inoperable isolation valve, be isolated by using at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position. This was done by deactivating valves V-1-110 and V-1-111 on May 27. On August 15, the administrative controls keeping these valves deactivated were defeated although the valves remained in the closed position. However, since the breakers had been returned to the "ON" position, the capability to inadvertently open the valves existed.

#### Corrective Action

No immediate corrective action was taken because the limiting condition for operation, which was exceeded, was not identified until after reactor coolant temperature was below 212°F. This licensee event report will be required reading for Operations personnel to help prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.