

CONTROL BLOCK:

							1
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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

09		SYSTEM CODE Z Z		11	CAUSE CODE X		12	CAUSE SUBCODE Z		13	COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z						14	COMP. SUBCODE Z		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16
7	8	9	10		11		12		13							18	19			20			
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 8 2		23	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 8 6			26	27	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		29	REPORT TYPE L		31	REVISION NO. 0		32			
				21	22																		
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					
E		X		Z		Z		0 0 0 0				Y		N		Z		Z 9 9 9					
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

FACILITY STATUS (28) 0 6 2 (29) NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A (32) STA Observation of P1

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
1 6 7 8 9 10 11 NA 44
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
45 NA 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) NA (39)				
7	8	9	11	12	13				

PERSONNEL INJURIES	
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
18040	NA

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
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PUBLICITY
 ISSUED (2) (0) (N) (44) DESCRIPTION (45) NA
 7 8 9 10

8209160594 820902
 PDR ADOCK 05000366
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY
 68 69 80

H. L. Sumner - Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv.
NAME OF PREPARER: _____

PHONE: 912-367-7851

LER #: 50-366/1982-086
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report
for LER 50-366/1982-086

On August 14, 1982, Unit 2 Core Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density (CMFLPD) exceeded Fraction of Rated Thermal Power (F RTP) which is contrary to Tech Specs Section 3.2.2. The incident occurred following a control rod pattern adjustment. Discovery was made following performance of "Base Distribution and LPRM Calibration" procedure and "Periodic Core Evaluation" procedure. At 1050 CDT on August 14, 1982, CMFLPD equaled 0.677 at core location 31-10-03 while F RTP equaled 0.615. At 1206 CDT, the APRM (Average Power Range Monitors) readings were adjusted to read greater than or equal to 67.7% to comply with the action statement in Tech Specs Section 3.2.2, therefore the unit was in compliance with Tech Specs. These events are repetitive (see RO 50-366/1982-073).

High peaking factors (CMFLPD greater than F RTP) during times of low xenon concentration are common in BWR operation, particularly following control rod pattern adjustments. The site core management group will continue to review control rod withdrawal sequences and operating strategies in order to minimize high peaking problems in future core maneuvers.