



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 25, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-060/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable
Occurrence 82-060/03L. This report is required within
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks 742

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272
S PDR

Report Number: 82-060/03L

Report Date: 08-25/82

Occurrence Date: 08-07-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Primary Containment - Internal Pressure Out-of-Specification.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-120.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1080 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At approximately 0800 hours, August 7, 1982, a High Containment Pressure alarm was received, indicating 0.1 psig internal pressure. The Control Room Operator attempted to perform a pressure relief; however, Pressure-Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve LVC5 would not open from the control console. Investigation into the problem was initiated, and the operator increased surveillance of containment pressure. At 1215 hours, with Valve LVC5 still inoperable, internal pressure reached the Technical Specification limit of 0.3 psig, and Action Statement 3.6.1.4 was entered. At 1232 hours, Valve LVC5 was opened utilizing a temporary connection to the control air header, and a pressure relief was commenced. With the Valve LVC5 containment isolation circuit bypassed, and the affected penetration open, Action Statement 3.6.3.1.a was entered. At 1257 hours, containment pressure was 0.25 psig, and Action Statement 3.6.1.4 was terminated. The redundant pressure-vacuum relief isolation valve was operable throughout the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The inoperability of Valve LVC5 resulted from the failure of a control air solenoid valve on the actuator. No recent failures of the actuator have been noted, and the event was assumed to be of an isolated nature.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The limit on primary containment internal pressure insures that the peak pressure during a LOCA does not exceed the design pressure of 47 psig as demonstrated by accident analyses. Action Statement 3.6.1.4 requires: With the containment internal pressure outside of Technical Specification limits, restore the internal pressure to within limits within 1 hour, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

The one hour time interval specified in the action statement insures that containment pressure is returned to within the limits initially assumed in the FSAR. As noted, the pressure was reduced to less than 0.3 psig within 1 hour, in compliance with the action statement. Consequently, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved in the transient.

Operability of the containment isolation valves insures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to containment. Time limits specified are consistent with those assumed in the FSAR. Since the redundant valve was operable, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved.

Action Statement 3.6.3.1.a requires:

With 1 or more of the containment isolation valves inoperable, maintain at least 1 isolation valve operable in each affected penetration that is open, and restore the inoperable valves to operable status within 4 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

In both cases, the event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As discussed, containment pressure was decreased to less than the 0.3 psig limit within 1 hour. At 1448 hours, August 7, 1982, the pressure relief was terminated, and the temporary air jumper to Valve LVC5 was removed. With the valve and affected penetration closed, Action Statement 3.6.3.1.a was terminated. The failed solenoid was subsequently replaced, and on August 9, 1982, the valve automatic isolation feature and operation from the control room tested satisfactorily.

FAILURE DATA:

Asco
Solenoid Valve
Catalogue No. NP8344A74E

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-78