



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 25, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-056/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-056/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks 752

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272
S PDR

Report Number: 82-056/03L
Report Date: 08-25-82
Occurrence Date: 08-02-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Auxiliary Feedwater System - No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump - Inoperable.

This report is initiated by Incident Report 82-207.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 84% - Unit Load 860 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On August 2, 1982, at 0630 hours, during performance of Surveillance Procedure SP(O)4.0.5-P on No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump, the operator discovered that Recirculation Valve 11AF40 would not open as required. No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump was declared inoperable and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.7.1.2a was entered at 0630 hours.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation revealed that the low side of the flow transmitter had been inadvertently left isolated, causing indication of high flow to the valve positioner which shut recirculation Valve 11AF40. Prior to this, an operator had repositioned the flow transmitter low side isolation valve to facilitate maintenance which was being performed. Because this valve was not part of the maintenance tag-out, it was missed when the tag-out was cleared and the valves repositioned.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power. The Auxiliary Feedwater System in each unit is equipped with two parallel pumping systems for redundancy. The system is designed such, that should either pumping system be unavailable, the redundant system is fully capable of cooling down the unit. Therefore, because the alternate auxiliary feedwater pumping system was operable, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Action Statement 3.7.1.2a requires:

With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to operable status within 72 hours, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours.

Inoperability of one auxiliary feedwater pump, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode allowed by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Instrument isolation valves are the responsibility of the I&C Department and are not normally repositioned by Operations personnel.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The low side of the flow transmitter was unisolated and Surveillance Procedure SP(0)4.0.5-P was performed satisfactorily. No. 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was declared operable and Action Statement 3.7.1.2a was terminated at 1415 hours, August 2, 1982. A valve lineup was conducted to ensure that no other sensing line isolation valves for No. 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump were improperly positioned. The Shift Supervisor counseled the operator on the implications of this occurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-78