



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 3, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-087/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station  
Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,  
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable  
Occurrence 82-087/03L. This report is required within  
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

RH:ks *762*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311  
S PDR

The Energy People

*IEU*

Report Number: 82-087/03L  
Report Date: 09-03-82  
Occurrence Date: 08-16-82  
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Diesel Generator 2C - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-236.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 81% - Unit Load 890 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1805 hours, August 16, 1982, during performance of routine surveillance, the operator discovered that Diesel Generator 2C Air Supply Isolation Valves 21DA12C and 22DA12C were closed. The operator immediately restored the valves to the required open position, and notified the shift supervisor of this occurrence. At 2200 hours, it was determined that an unusual event should be entered and the NRC was notified.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The valves had been shut by an unknown person for an undetermined reason.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability requirements of the AC and DC power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses. They are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite AC and DC power sources and associated distribution systems operable during accident conditions, coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power, and single failure of the other onsite AC source. This ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility and the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. Because redundant emergency AC generation capability was supplied by the other diesel generators, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

3 OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

a Statement 3.8.1.1a requires:

With either an offsite circuit or diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the remaining AC sources by performing the applicable surveillance requirements within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore at least two offsite circuits and three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Inoperability of one diesel generator, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, the valves were immediately repositioned to the proper open position. Additional security measures and precautions have been initiated in compliance with Confirmation Action Letter (C.A.L. 82-22), issued by the NRC, August 18, 1982 to the Senior Vice President of Energy Supply and Production, Public Service Electric and Gas Company.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller

N.J. Infelise  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-80

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

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
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Prepared By R. Heller

  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-80