



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 25, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-061/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable
Occurrence 82-061/03L. This report is required within
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks 757

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272
S PDR

The Energy People

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05/21/82 (20M) 11-81

Report Number: 82-061/03L
Report Date: 08-25-82
Occurrence Date: 08-11-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 13 Containment Fan Coil Unit - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-225.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 55% - Unit Load 600 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0310 hours, August 11, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator noticed that the service water flow indication for No. 13 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) was erratic. The unit was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was entered. Both containment spray systems were operable throughout the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The erratic service water indication was due to silt plugging the high side sensing line of the outlet flow transmitter. The silt is carried by the service water and deposited in portions of the system where flow velocity is reduced.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The CFCU's operate in conjunction with the containment spray systems to remove heat and radioactive contamination from the containment atmosphere in the event of a design basis accident. Operability of either all fan coil groups or of both containment spray systems is necessary to ensure offsite radiation dose is maintained within the limits of 10CFR100.

Because redundant cooling capability was provided by the containment spray systems, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a requires:

With one group of containment cooling fans inoperable, restore the inoperable group of cooling fans to operable status within the next 7 days, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The plugged sensing line was blown down to remove the accumulated silt. The transmitter was returned to service, and the CFCU was satisfactorily tested. No. 13 CFCU was declared operable, and at 2020 hours, August 11, 1982, Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was terminated.

A program to blow down the transmitters weekly was already in effect at the time of the occurrence, and has successfully reduced the frequency of plugged sensing lines.

FAILURE DATA:

Transmitter problems due to sensing lines being plugged with silt occurred four times in 1981; this is the first instance this year.

Prepared By R. Frahm


General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-78