



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 25, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-076/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable
Occurrence 82-076/03L. This report is required within
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks *HSZ*

CC: Distribution

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The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-076/03L
Report Date: 08-25-82
Occurrence Date: 08-06-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment-Gas Radiation Monitor - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-210.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 910 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On August 6, 1982, at 1515 hours, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator received indication of malfunction of Containment-Gas Radiation Monitor System, Channel 2R12A. The monitor was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.3.1b Actions 24 and 25 were entered at 1515 hours.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation into the cause of the Channel 2R12A malfunction revealed that the test jack had failed. The test jack is directly in the signal line between the detector and meter. When the test jack failed, it prevented proper electrical connection of the meter and detector, causing an erroneous meter indication.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Containment-Gas Radiation Monitor provides indication of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulate in containment for the purpose of detecting Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage. It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits specified by the Technical Specifications; a high radioactivity level initiates automatic closure of the containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Redundant RCS leak detection capability is provided by the Containment Sump Monitoring System. Backup for the containment purge and pressure functions is provided by the Plant Vent Monitor 2R41C, although the setpoints have to be lowered for this purpose. Failure of the Containment Atmosphere Monitor, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Due to backup monitoring capability, the event resulted in no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Action 24 requires:

With only two of the RCS leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours when the required gaseous and or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Action 25 requires:

With the containment purge and pressure vacuum relief isolation system inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves were maintained closed in accordance with operating instructions, in compliance with the limiting condition for operation. The test jack was replaced, and a channel calibration check was satisfactorily performed. The Containment-Gas Radiation Monitor was declared operable and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1b Actions 24 and 25 were terminated at 2.15 hours, August 6, 1982.

FAILURE DATA:

Victoreen Corporation
Scaler Module 8625
Test Jack

Prepared By R. Heller



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-78