

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: 

1	2	3	4	5	6
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 (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1
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0	H	D	B	S	1
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 (2) 

0	0	-	0	0	N	P	F	-	0	3
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 (3) 

4	1	1	1	1
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 (4) 

5
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 (5)

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE

CONT  
0 1  
7 8

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 4 6 7 1 1 2 7 7 8 8 1 2 0 8 7 8 9  
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 63 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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On 11/27/78, during a meeting to discuss a proposed change to the steam generator level setpoints for the Auxiliary Feedwater System, it was determined that station procedures failed to specify the proper actions for the event of a combined Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) and Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) actuation. This inadequacy of administrative controls is being reported as per Tech Spec 6.9.1.8(i). The special 120 inch level setpoint is only required in the unlikely event of an SFRCS actuation and a small Reactor Coolant System break. (NP-32-78-12)

SYSTEM CODE C H 11		CAUSE CODE D 12		CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13		COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z 14						COMP. SUBCODE Z 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 8		EVENT YEAR 7 8		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 1 1 5		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1		REPORT TYPE T		REVISION NO. 0							
ACTION TAKEN G 18		FUTURE ACTION G 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z Z Z Z 26	

33 34 35 36

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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1	0	The unique requirement of a 120 inch level setpoint for a combined SFRCS and SFAS
1	1	actuation was not recognized. Modifications to all station procedures related to
1	2	SFRCS actuation are being prepared.
1	3	
1	4	

7 8 9  
FACILITY STATUS (28) E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27  
% POWER 0 8 1 (29) NA OTHER STATUS (30)  
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) Z (32) Discovered during meeting on Setpoints  
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
80

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE  
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)  
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 2 33 2 34 NA NA

44 45 60

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION
NUMBER				
1	7	0	0	0
		37	2	38
				NA

						PERSONNEL INJURIES							
						NUMBER		DESCRIPTION					
						0	0	(40)	NA				

7		8		9		11		12	
				LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				(43)	
TYPE				DESCRIPTION					
1	9	Z	(42)	NA					

7 8 9 10  
PUBLICATION  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 7312140 140  
N (44) NA  
NRC USE ONLY

DVR 78-176 NAME OF PREPARER Jacque Lingenfelter PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 225

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-78-12

DATE OF EVENT: November 27, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Procedure inadequacy if a small Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak occurred during a Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) actuation

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2250, and Load (MWE) = 720.

Description of Occurrence: On November 27, 1978, Toledo Edison and Babcock and Wilcox personnel met to discuss a proposed change to the steam generator level setpoints for the Auxiliary Feedwater System, which provides feedwater when the SFRCS is actuated.

A steam generator level of about 35 inches was determined to be adequate in all cases of SFRCS actuation except when an RCS leak in the "small break" category occurs. An SFRCS actuation in conjunction with a small break requires a 120 inch level setpoint.

With the present control configuration, 120 inch steam generator level setpoint is automatically obtained in all cases of SFRCS actuation. In order to minimize the effects of the cooldown following auxiliary feedwater injection, station emergency procedures direct the operator to take manual control of the auxiliary feedwater and maintain a lower level. The procedures do not tell the operator to leave the auxiliary feedwater in automatic ("Auto Essential") if a small RCS break occurs with the SFRCS actuation, or to return to automatic if a small break occurs after SFRCS actuation. Actuation of the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Incident Level 2 is considered to be the indication of a small break.

Failure of the procedures to specify the proper actions for the event of a combined SFRCS and SFAS actuation is being reported as per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(i).

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The procedural inadequacy occurred because the unique requirement of a 120 inch steam generator level setpoint for a SFRCS and SFAS actuation was not recognized until the proposed change in setpoints was investigated.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The 120 inch steam generator level setpoint is only required in the unlikely event of an SFRCS actuation and a small RCS break.

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Corrective Action: Modifications to all station procedures related to SFRCS actuation are being prepared. The modifications will require the operator to leave (or return) the auxiliary feedwater controls in automatic in the event of an SFAS Incident Level 2 actuation occurring with an SFRCS actuation.

Failure Data: No previous discoveries of procedure errors due to unrecognized safety analysis assumptions have been made.

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