

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | N | P | 7 | - | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 58

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On 10/31/78 at 0700 hours, Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) 1-2 and 2-1 tripped. This
0 3 | placed the unit in Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.4.1. On 11/13/78
0 4 | at 1300 hours with the unit at 99% of full power, RCPs 1-2 and 2-1 tripped and a
0 5 | reactor trip occurred. Since the reactor trip occurred just prior to the loss of the
0 6 | second RCP, the unit was not placed in the Action Statement on 11/13/78 and was in
0 7 | compliance with the Operating License. One other RCP in each loop was operable dur-
ing the period that RCPs 1-2 and 2-1 were inoperable. (NP-33-78-129)
7 8 9 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | C | B | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | A | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | R | E | L | A | Y | X | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | A | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 7 | 8 | 21 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 1 | 0 | 9 | 24 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 31 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32
ACTION TAKEN | B | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 27 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | Y | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | C | 6 | 4 | 9 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | On 10/31/78 technicians found the main fuse for the non-safety related RCP cabinet was
1 1 | blown and replaced it. Both RCP were restarted by 0945 hours on 10/31/78. On 11/13/78
1 2 | it was discovered two non-safety related relays were defective which caused an in-
1 3 | crease in circuit load to blow the fuse. Further investigation revealed improper
1 4 | wiring of the fuse circuit. Defective relays were replaced and circuits rewired.
7 8 9 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | C | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 0 | 4 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | NA | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 36 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 37
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | Z | 42 | NA | 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

2 0 | PUBLICITY | N | 44 | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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NRC USE ONLY

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-129

DATE OF EVENT: October 31, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Reactor Coolant Pumps 1-2 and 2-1 Inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: On October 31, 1978, the unit was in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = approximately 110, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On October 31, 1978, at 0700 hours, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-2 and RCP 2-1 (in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loops 1 and 2, respectively) tripped. This placed the unit in Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.4.1 for Modes 1 and 2. The Technical Specification requires the operability of both reactor coolant loops and both Reactor Coolant Pumps on each loop. Action Statement (b) states that startup and power operation may be initiated and may proceed provided thermal power is restricted to less than 50.6% of rated thermal power. The setpoints for high flux and flux- Δ flux-flow trips must be reduced within four hours to the values specified in Technical Specification 2.2.1. In addition, this occurrence was not in accordance with the Operating License Condition 2c(3)(a) which requires at least three Reactor Coolant Pumps in operation while in Modes 1 or 2.

On November 13, 1978, at 1300 hours, with the unit at 99% of full power, Reactor Coolant Pumps 1-2 and 2-1 tripped, and a reactor trip occurred. Since the reactor trip occurred just prior to the loss of the second Reactor Coolant Pump (which placed the unit in Mode 3), the unit was not placed in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.4.1, and was in compliance with the Operating License Condition 2c(3)(a). The November 13, 1978 event is included in this report since the cause of the RCP trips was determined during the investigation of the November 13, 1978 event.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: On October 31, 1978, Instrument and Control technicians found that the main fuse for the non-safety related RCP Cabinet 3718 was blown, which caused the RCP 1-2 and 2-1 trips. It was planned to further investigate the cause of the blown fuse during the next plant outage.

After the reactor trip on November 13, 1978, it was discovered that two non-safety related relays were defective in Relay Cabinet RC 3718. Further investigation under Maintenance Work Order 78-2647 revealed improper initial wiring of the fuse circuit which caused both the pumps to trip from the main power supply fuse in the relay cabinet.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. One other Reactor Coolant Pump in each loop was operable during the period that RCP 1-2 and 2-1 were inoperable.

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Corrective Action: Maintenance electricians replaced the fuse for RCP Relay Cabinet 3718 on October 31, 1978. RCP 2-1 was started at 0940 hours, and RCP 1-2 started at 0945 hours on October 31. The unit was thus removed from Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.4.1.

Thermal power was maintained at less than 50.6% of rated thermal power. Since the unit was in the Action Statement for less than four hours, it was unnecessary to reduce the setpoints for high flux and flux- Δ flux-flow trips as given in the Action Statement.

On November 13, 1978, under Maintenance Work Orders 78-2647, 78-2651 and 78-2652, the defective relays were replaced and all Reactor Coolant Pump relay cabinets fuse circuits were rewired in accordance with the wiring diagram.

Failure Data: There have been no previously reported failures of RCPs due to blown fuses.

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