

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	1	L	Q	A	D	2	2	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE					14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

0 1  
7 8

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5 7 0 9 2 9 7 8 8 1 0 2 0 7 8 9  
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | The Unit Two Main Steam Target Rock Pressure Relief Valve (2-203-3A) failed to open  
0 3 | while performing semi-annual test procedure QOS 201-1. Unit Two was being shutdown  
0 4 | for a scheduled weekend maintenance outage at the time. Safe plant operation was  
0 5 | not affected since HPCI and the remaining four auto-pressure relief valves were  
0 6 | operable.  
0 7 |  
0 8 |

SYSTEM CODE C C (11)		CAUSE CODE E (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE B (13)		COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X (14)				COMP. SUBCODE X (15)		VALVE SUBCODE B (16)	
7 8		9 10		11		12 13		14 15 16 17 18		19 20		21 22	
(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 7 8		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 2		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE L		REVISION NO. 0			
23		24 25 26		27		28 29		30 31		32			
ACTION TAKEN B (18) Z (19)		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD A (21)		HOURS 0 0 0 0 (22)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y (24)	
33 34		35 36		37 38 39 40		41 42		43 44		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (25)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER T 0 2 0 (26)	
33 34		35 36		37 38 39 40		41 42		43 44		45 46 47 48		49 50	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of this occurrence was due to a broken air line to the valve's manual air

1 1 | operator. The corrective action taken was to repair the broken air line. The

1 | 2-203-3A valve was subsequently tested during unit startup and proven operable.

1 3 |

1 4 |

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

FACILITY STATUS (28) D % POWER (29) 0 2 3 OTHER STATUS (30) NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) B DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Routine Test

ACTIVITY CONTENT (33) 1 6 Z RELEASED OF RELEASE (34) Z AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) NA	7811240224			
7	8	9	11	12	13	80			

PERSONNEL INJURIES										
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION						
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA				

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY							
TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	9	Z	(42)	NA			
7	8	9	10				

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
2 0 N (44) NA 68 69 70

NAME OF PREPARER M. Reed

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- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 78-32/03L-0
- II. LICENSE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On September 29, 1978, Unit Two Main Steam Target Rock Pressure Relief Valve (2-203-3A) failed to open while performing semi-annual test procedure QOS 201-1. When the unit operator placed the key switch to the MANUAL position, he received a dual indication on the valve position indicating lights, and observed only a 5% compensating closure of the full open Main Steam Bypass Valve. The operator again attempted to open the relief valve, but no change in bypass valve position was observed.

Unit Two was in the RUN mode at a thermal power of 570 MWt. The Unit was being shutdown for a scheduled weekend maintenance outage.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The consequences of this occurrence were minimal since redundancy has been provided in the automatic pressure relief function, in that only four of the five relief valves are required to operate. All four Electromatic Relief Valves were tested and found to be operable. Thus, loss of one of the relief valves does not materially affect the pressure relieving capability of the automatic pressure relief system. Also, the four Electromatic Relief Valves were capable of actuating in the event of an ECCS auto blowdown initiation. The safety mode of the 2-203-3A Target Rock Valve was unaffected and would have opened at designed pressure conditions.

VII. CAUSE:

The 2-203-3A relief valve failed to open due to a broken stainless steel air line to the diaphragm of the valve operator. The air line was found broken at the valve.

The 2-203-3A safety relief valve, Model 67F, is manufactured by Target Rock Corporation.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Work Request number 4529-78 was written to repair the broken air line. The end of the air line was rethreaded and reattached to the valve. On October 1, 1978, while Unit Two was returning to power, the 2-203-3A relief valve was again tested and proven to operate properly.

Since this is the first failure of this type, no further actions are deemed necessary.