

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE: 010 H D B S 1
 LICENSE NUMBER: 000-000 N P F - 03
 LICENSE TYPE: 41111
 CAT 58: 4

REPORT SOURCE: L
 DOCKET NUMBER: 050-0346
 EVENT DATE: 022878
 REPORT DATE: 032778

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
 At 1000 hours on February 28, 1978, Main Steam Isolation Valve MS 101 was rendered inoperable to allow Maintenance to remove raised metal on two of four spring guide tubes. Rendering the valve inoperable placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specifications 3.6.3.1 and 3.7.1.5. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or unit personnel. The unit was in Hot Standby conditions during the performance of the activity. (NP-33-78-27)

SYSTEM CODE: C D
 CAUSE CODE: X
 CAUSE SUBCODE: Z
 COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X
 COMP. SUBCODE: E
 VALVE SUBCODE: D
 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 024
 OCCURRENCE CODE: 03
 REPORT TYPE: L
 REVISION NO.: 1
 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: R 3 4 4
 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 78
 ACTION TAKEN: X
 FUTURE ACTION: X
 EFFECT ON PLANT: Z
 SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z
 HOURS: 0000
 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y
 NPD-4 FORM SUB.: Y
 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
 The cause of raised metal is not known. The raised metal was filed down and the guide tubes polished and lubricated per Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 78-503. The valve's closing time speed was adjusted to less than five seconds per MWO IC 235-78. The Containment Isolation Valve Post Maintenance Test was successfully completed and the valve declared operable at 1355 hours on February 28, 1978.

FACILITY STATUS: G
 % POWER: 000
 OTHER STATUS: NA
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A Local observation
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z
 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA
 LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
 NUMBER: 000
 TYPE: Z
 DESCRIPTION: NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES
 NUMBER: 000
 DESCRIPTION: NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
 TYPE: Z
 DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY
 ISSUED: NA

NRC USE ONLY

PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 250

78112-0274

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-27

DATE OF EVENT: February 28, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) MS 101 rendered inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3 with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 1000 hours on February 28, 1978, MSIV MS101 was rendered inoperable to allow Maintenance to remove raised metal on two of four spring guide tubes. Raised metal was observed on spring guide tubes on February 27, 1978, after valve was opened following a plant trip on February 24, 1978.

Rendering the valve inoperable placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 which requires all containment isolation valves to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4, and Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 which requires both MSIVs to be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The MSIV was removed from service to allow maintenance on the spring guide tubes. This was done to assure continued proper operation of the MSIV. The cause of raised metal is not known.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The unit was in Hot Standby conditions during the performance of the activity. After completion of the repair, the reactor was taken critical at 1551 hours on February 28, 1978.

Corrective Action: The raised metal was filed down and the guide tubes polished with an abrasive wheel and lubricated with FELPRO N1000 per Maintenance Work Order 78-503. The valve was operated and tested per Surveillance Test ST 5064.01, "Containment Isolation Valve Post Maintenance Test".

The initial closing time exceeded the allowable closing time of five seconds of Technical Specifications 3.6.3.1 and 3.7.1.5. Maintenance Work Order IC 235-78 adjusted closing time speed to less than five seconds. Surveillance Test ST 5064.01 was successfully re-run and the valve declared operable at 1355 hours on February 28, 1978, removing the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specifications 3.6.3.1 and 3.7.1.5.

LER #78-024

Rockwell International (the valve vendor) representatives inspected the valve on March 1, 1978. Rockwell International recommended changing the original carbon steel guide tubes to aluminum bronze guide tubes to prevent the possibility of galling of the spring tubes.

On July 7, 1978, work was completed which removed the original carbon steel guide tubes and replaced them with guide tubes of aluminum bronze on MSIVs MS 100 and MS 101. This change was made per Facility Change Request 78-184 at the recommendation of the valve vendor, Rockwell International, and with the assistance of one of their representatives. All materials were provided by Rockwell.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar reportable occurrences of an MSIV removed from operability to remove raised metal.

LER #78-024