

UPDATE REPORT:

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 1/10/77

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'TEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

PUBLICITY
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
 NA
 NRC USE ONLY

NRC USE ONLY

Y265

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 76-068/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

Following 50% core scram testing, CRD F-5 was found to uncouple and overtravel when withdrawn to position 48. An insertion to position 44 and subsequent withdrawal to position 48 showed the drive to be recoupled. A second scram and withdrawal to position 48 again uncoupled the drive. CRD F-5 was then inserted to position 00 and disarmed. The three symmetrical drives in the remaining quadrants were also fully inserted.

On 12/30/76, an on-site review determined that a loosened inner filter caused the blade and drive to uncouple at position 48. It was also determined that the loosened filter could not exert sufficient pressure to uncouple the blade except when the drive was fully withdrawn to position 48; upon insertion, the blade and drive automatically recoupled. Since the possibility of uncoupling the blade existed only when the drive was withdrawn to position 48, CRD F-5 was then declared operable. As a precautionary measure, an Operating Order was issued to ensure that a coupling check was performed whenever drive F-5 was withdrawn to position 48. Also, if a subsequent uncoupling occurred, immediate action was to be taken to ensure that the drive's status complied with Tech Spec section 3.3.B.1.

As mentioned above, symptom and performance evaluations indicated that a loosened inner filter had caused the blade and drive to uncouple at the fully withdrawn position. Loosening of the filter could have resulted from improper installation and latching spring fatigue.

On October 6, 1977 CRD F-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long ($173.406 + 0.375$ in.) The abnormal length, coupled with an unlatched inner filter, resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

CRD F-5 had been last overhauled in January, 1975. Since May, 1975 a 20 to 30 pound pull test on the inner filter has been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly procedure. Control Rod Drives overhauled and reassembled under this revised procedure have not experienced uncoupling. The revised procedure, coupled with improved Quality Control Coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly, are believed to be adequate to prevent future CRD uncoupling.