

LICENSE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT:

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 12/2/77

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 I L D R S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
 9 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 38

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 5 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 7 1 1 0 2 7 7 8 9
 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating uncoupling during functional testing. It was recoupled and coupling verified in accordance with T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling had minimal safety significance since it occurred only when the rod was withdrawn to position 48. This was the first uncoupling of CRD H-5. Several other CRD's have uncoupled in the past. Reportable occurrences: 50-237/77-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/76-68, 72.

SYSTEM CODE R B 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE F 13 COMPONENT CODE C R D R V E 14 COMP SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
 ACTION TAKEN Z 18 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 19 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPD-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G 0 8 0 26
 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

An unlatched inner filter and abnormally long uncoupling rod resulted in the uncoupling of CRD H-5 during functional testing. Drive had been overhauled in Jan. 1975. A pull test on the inner filter has now been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly procedure. Revised procedure and improved QA coverage believed to be adequate to prevent future similar events.

FACILITY STATUS H 20 POWER 0 0 0 21 OTHER STATUS NA 22 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 23 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Functional Testing 32
 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39
 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43
 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45
 NAME OF PREPARER J. Wujciga PHONE 465

7811160125
 50-237-5

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-054/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating uncoupling when withdrawn to position 48 during functional testing. CRD H-5 was recoupled and coupling verified in accordance with the requirements of T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling had minimal safety significance since it occurred only when the rod was withdrawn to position 48. This was the first uncoupling of CRD H-5. Five other CRD's had previously uncoupled since the 1975 Unit 2 refueling outage (reportable occurrences: 50-237/1977-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/1976-68, 72).

On November 9, 1977 CRD H-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long ($173.406 + 0.562$ "). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

As part of the revised reassembly procedure, C.E.Co. Quality Control personnel performed the inner filter installation and the reduced 20-30 pound pull test. In Feb., 1978 the Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance procedure DMP 209 was further changed to permit Maintenance Personnel to install the inner filter. This change occurred due to previously existing Management-Union work agreements. However, Quality Control Personnel will verify proper installation of the inner filter and continue to conduct the 20-30 pound pull test. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future similar events.