NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT:
PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 9/1/77

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I L D R S 2 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)
LICENSEE CODE (9–14) | LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) | LICENSE TYPE (26–30) | CAT (57–58)

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 (7) | 0 8 0 2 7 7 (8) | 1 0 2 7 7 8 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) | EVENT DATE (69–74) | REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During one-half core scram testing, CRD's F-5 & H-7 uncoupled when withdrawn to po-
0 3 sition 48. Event has little safety significance since uncoupling occurred only at
0 4 pos. 48 and CRD's retain capability to scram as before uncoupling. Event occurred
0 5 previously with CRD F-5 as ref in R.O. 50-237/1976-68. CRD's F-5 & H-7 were recoupled
0 6 according to procedure and recoupling verified by observing no overtravel indication
0 7 when each CRD was twice withdrawn to position 48.
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	R B (11)	A (12)	F (13)	C R D R V E (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 7	—	0 2 9	/	0 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
G (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	G 0 8 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 An unlatched inner filter and abnormally long uncoupling rod resulted in the un-
1 1 coupling of CRD F-5 and H-7. Drives had been overhauled in Jan. 1975. A pull test
1 2 on inner filter has now been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly procedure.
1 3 Revised procedure and improved QA coverage believed adequate to prevent future CRD
1 4 uncouplings.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	0 6 6 (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance Testing

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

7811140213

50-237-5

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER J. Wujciga PHONE X265

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-029/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

During routine one-half core scram testing, control rod drives (CRD's) F-5 & H-7 uncoupled and overtraveled when withdrawn to position 48 following testing. This event has little safety significance since uncoupled CRD's still retain the same capability to scram as before uncoupling and uncoupling only occurs at position 48. This event had occurred previously with CRD F-5 on December 12, 1976 (Reportable Occurrence #50-237/1976-68). CRD's F-5 & H-7 were recoupled according to procedure and recoupling verified by observing no overtravel indication when each CRD was twice withdrawn to position 48.

On October 6, 1977 and September 30, 1977 CRDs F-5 and H-7 were disassembled and inspected per control rod drive inspection and maintenance procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that in both cases the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod on both rods was abnormally long (173.406 + 0.562). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD's during normal operating conditions.

As part of the reassembly procedure, C.E.Co. Quality Control personnel performed the inner filter installation and the required 20-30 pound pull test. In Feb., 1978 the Control Rod Drive Inspection and maintenance procedure DMP 209 was changed to permit maintenance personnel to install the inner filter. This change occurred due to existing Management-Union work agreements. However, Quality Control personnel will verify proper installation of the inner filter and continue to conduct the 20-30 pound pull test. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future CRD uncouplings.