

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT:

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 7/1/77

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	I	L	D	R	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	9						14	15	25										26	30					57	CAT	58
		LICENSEE CODE							LICENSE NUMBER											LICENSE TYPE								

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 7 0 6 0 5 7 7 8 1 0 2 7 7 8 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During routine startup operations, CRD L-5 was found to uncouple and overtravel when
0 3 | withdrawn to pos. 48. CRD L-5 was inserted and disarmed. Rx startup operations re-
0 4 | sumed after it was determined that L-5's pos. and core location did not adversely
0 5 | affect core symmetry. Following start-up an overtravel check of L-5 proved satis-
0 6 | factory, verifying that CRD L-5 was recoupled and operable. This event occurred
0 7 | previously with this rod as ref. in R.O. #50-237/1977-15.

SYSTEM CODE R B (11)		CAUSE CODE A (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE F (13)		COMPONENT CODE C R D R V E (14)				COMP. SUBCODE Z (15)		VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)	
EVENT YEAR 7 7 (17)		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 2 (18)		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 (19)		REPORT TYPE X (20)		REVISION NO. 1 (21)		ACTION TAKEN G (22)		FUTURE ACTION Z (23)	
EFFECT ON PLANT Z (24)		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (25)		HOURS 0 0 0 0 (26)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (27)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y (28)		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (29)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G 0 8 0 (30)	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 An unlatched inner filter and abnormally long uncoupling rod resulted in the uncoupling
1 1 of CRD L-5 during normal operating conditions. Since the last overhaul of CRD L-5 in
1 2 Jan. 1975, a pull test on the inner filter has been incorporated in the overhaul &
1 3 assembly procedure. The revised procedure and improved OA coverage is believed
1 4 adequate to prevent future similar events.

FACILITY STATUS				% POWER				OTHER STATUS				METHOD OF DISCOVERY				DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			
1	5	C	28	0	0	0	29	NA				A	31	Operational Event					
ACTIVITY CONTENT				RELEASED OF RELEASE				AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE							
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA				NA									
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				PERSONNEL INJURIES				LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				PUBLICITY							
NUMBER				NUMBER				TYPE				DESCRIPTION							
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA				NA							
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA				NA									
1	9	Z	42	NA				NA				NA							
2	0	N	44	NA				NA				NA							

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J. Wujciga

PHONE: 265

[illegible]

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-022/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

During routine startup operations, control rod drive (CRD) L-5 became uncoupled and overtraveled when withdrawn to position 48. This event occurred previously with this control rod on April 2, 1977 (Reportable Occurrence Number 50-237/1977-15). CRD L-5 was inserted and electrically disarmed. Reactor startup operations were resumed since the position and core location of control rod L-5 did not adversely affect core symmetry. At a reactor power above 20%, L-5 was recoupled and withdrawn to position 48 and checked for overtravel. The overtravel check verified CRD L-5 to be recoupled and operable.

This was the twelfth Control Rod Drive (CRD) uncoupling event at Dresden Unit 2 during the preceeding four years. The inspection of CRD's which had previously experienced this event indicated that improper inner filter installation was probably responsible for the uncoupling. If the inner filter becomes unlatched, full withdrawal of the control rod to position 48 could result in CRD uncoupling. Symptoms of this event indicated that the same inner filter problem probably existed with CRD L-5.

On November 30, 1977 CRD L-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long ($173.406 + 0.750$ "). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

As part of the reassembly procedure, C.E.Co. Quality Control Personnel performed the inner filter installation and a required 20-30 pound pull test. In Feb., 1978 the Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209 was further changed to permit Maintenance Personnel to install the inner filter. This change occurred due to existing Management-Union Work Agreements. However, Quality Control Personnel will continue to conduct the 20-30 pound pull test. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future similar events.