NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: O H D B S 1 (2)	LICENSE NUMBER: Ø Ø - Ø Ø N P F - Ø 3 (3)	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4)	CAT: (5)

CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	DOCKET NUMBER: Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6 (7)	EVENT DATE: 1 Ø Ø 9 7 8 (8)	REPORT DATE: 1 1 Ø 1 7 8 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During the performance of surveillance testing on 10/9/78 at 1510 hours, point R216
0 3 on the heat trace was found to be one degree below the 105°F temperature as required
0 4 per Technical Specification (TS) 4.1.2.2. The Boric Acid Flowpath was declared inop-
0 5 erable at 1530 hours on 10/9/78. Since the point at which boric acid crystallizes
0 6 at the highest concentration possible coming from the Boric Acid Addition Tank is
0 7 95°F, there was no danger of any crystallization in the heat traced line.
0 8 (NP-33-78-122)

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	P C (11)	X (12)	X (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 8	—	1 Ø 3	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	T 1 8 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 During the checkout of recorder point R2-16 in circuit 109, a blown fuse was found in
1 1 the temperature controller. The fuse was replaced, and the circuit was checked again
1 2 and found operating properly. The boric acid injection heat trace was declared opera-
1 3 ble following a retest of the line on 10/12/78 at 0950 hours, and the unit was re-
1 4 moved from the Action Statement.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS: G (28)	% POWER: Ø Ø Ø (29)	OTHER STATUS (30): NA	METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Surveillance Test ST 5011.01

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER: Ø Ø Ø (37)	TYPE: Z (38)	DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER: Ø Ø Ø (40)	DESCRIPTION (41): NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE: Z (42)	DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED: N (44)	DESCRIPTION (45): NA	NRC USE ONLY

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NAME OF PREPARER: Fedel Caba PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 236

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-122

DATE OF EVENT: October 9, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Boric Acid Flowpath Heat Trace was declared inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: During the performance of ST 5011.01, Section 6.1, "Boron Injection Flowpath Heat Trace Test", on October 9, 1978, at 1510 hours, point R2-16 on the circuit log of the heat trace was found to be one degree below the 105°F temperature as required per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.2. The Boric Acid Flowpath was declared inoperable at 1530 hours on October 9, 1978, which placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.1.2.2.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: During an instrument and control checkout of the heat trace on October 10, 1978, the temperature of point R2-16 was back up to its normal value of 115°F. The surveillance test was rerun on October 12, 1978 at 0950 hours and the temperature of point R2-16 read 115°F, after which the boron injection flowpath was declared operable. Then following an electrical maintenance checkout of circuit 109, a blown fuse in the temperature controller was found. It appears that the temperature was originally increased to 115°F from the periodic injection of boric acid from the Boric Acid Addition Tank (which is at approximately 130°F) through the heat traced line. The heat trace was, therefore, thought to be operating properly until the blown fuse was discovered.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. Since the temperature was only one degree below the acceptable value, and the point at which boric acid crystallizes at the highest concentration possible coming from the Boric Acid Addition Tank is 95°F, there was no danger of any crystallization in the heat traced line.

Corrective Action: The instruments and controls of the heat trace point R2-16 were checked and found to be working properly on October 10, 1978, under Instrument and Control Work Request I&C-3052. The electrical components were checked on October 14, 1978, under Maintenance Work Request 78-1441 and a blown fuse was discovered in the temperature controller. It was replaced, and the circuit was checked out and found to be operating properly.

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The surveillance test of the boric acid heat trace was repeated on October 12, 1978, at 0950 hours. The boric acid flowpath was declared operable, and the unit was removed from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.1.2.2.

Failure Data: There have been no previous reported similar occurrences.

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