

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: All three incidents were caused by personnel errors. The electrician bumped into the undervoltage relay. The operator lined the synchroscope to the wrong bus for both attempts to transfer essential bus D1 power supply from Diesel Generator 1-2 to bus D2.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The core decay heat was extremely low since the unit had been shutdown since April 28, 1978. The brief loss of decay heat flow did not cause excessive core temperatures.

Corrective Action: At 1621 hours on June 15, 1978, essential bus D1 was re-energized by performing a "dead transfer" from the Control Room of power from bus D2 to essential bus D1.

The operator was instructed to be more careful when transferring bus power and the electricians were instructed to be more careful when working on live breakers.

Failure Data: A previous loss of decay heat flow due to an essential bus being de-energized by personnel error was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-72. The bus was de-energized initially at different locations and personnel were performing different activities at the time of the incidents.

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