

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 4 6 7 0 9 1 5 7 8 8 1 0 1 3 7 8 9

60 61 68 69 74 75 80

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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On 9/15/78 at 1144 hours, Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 2 tripped due to high

CCW heat exchanger 2 outlet temperature. This placed the unit in the Action Statement.

of Technical Specification 3.7.3.1 which requires two CCW loops while the unit is in

Modes 1 through 4. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or unit

personnel. CCW Loop 1 remained operable. (NP-33-78-114)

[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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Operations personnel had failed to reopen the service water outlet valve after the

flow balance on 9/11/78. CCW Pump 2 was started by defeating the high temperature

trip and SW38 was reopened. At 1317 hours on 9/15/78, CCW Loop 2 was declared opera-

ble. All operators will be informed by a memo of the circumstances of this incident

and proper operator actions to prevent recurrence.

7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 E (28) 0 9 0 (29) NA A (31) Pump Trip 80

7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z (33) Z (34) NA NA 80

| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES |   |       |        |             |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------------------|---|-------|--------|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| NUMBER              |   |       | TYPE   | DESCRIPTION |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1                   | 7 | 0 0 0 | (37) Z | (38) NA     |  |  |  |  |  |

| PERSONNEL INJURIES |             |
|--------------------|-------------|
| NUMBER             | DESCRIPTION |
| 1 8                | NA          |

|   |   |   |    |    |                                    |
|---|---|---|----|----|------------------------------------|
| 1 | 9 | Z | 42 | NA | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) |
| 2 | 8 | 9 | 10 |    |                                    |

NRC USE ONLY

7 8 9 10  
PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
2 0 N (44) NA  
7 8 9 10 68 69  
5-12-20-1755

DVR 78-148

78/02302  
NAME OF PREPARER

Jim Zell

PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext 276

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-114

DATE OF EVENT: September 15, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Component Cooling Water Loop 2 declared inoperable due to error in Service Water Valve Lineup

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2495, and Load (MWE) = 830.

Description of Occurrence: On September 15, 1978 at 1144 hours, Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 2 tripped due to high CCW heat exchanger 2 outlet temperature. Technical Specification 3.7.3.1 requires two CCW loops while the unit is in Modes 1 through 4. Technical Specification 3.7.3.1 requires that with one CCW loop inoperable, the inoperable loop must be restored to operable status within 72 hours or the unit be in hot standby within six hours and cold shutdown within the next 30 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is personnel error. It was discovered that the service water from CCW Heat Exchanger 1-2 Outlet Isolation Valve SW 38 was closed. Operations personnel had failed to re-open the valve after the service water flow balance on September 11, 1978.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. CCW Loop 1 remained operable, and while loop 2 was inoperable, no condition requiring actuation of any safety features actuation system occurred.

Corrective Action: CCW Pump 2 was started by defeating the high temperature trip and SW 38 was reopened. At 1317 hours on September 15, 1978, CCW Loop 2 temperature returned to below the 95°F limit, the interlock was restored and CCW Loop 2 was declared operable. This removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.3.1. All operators will be informed by a memo of the circumstances of this incident and proper operator actions to prevent recurrence.

Failure Data: Although there have been previous reported personnel errors in valve lineups, there has been no previously reported service water valve lineup errors.

LER #78-098