

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

LICENSE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: 0 1 2 3
DOCKET NUMBER: 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
EVENT DATE: 0 9 1 0 7 8
REPORT DATE: 0 9 2 9 7 8

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While performing the MSIV closure monthly scram sensor functional test, procedure
0 3 | QOS 250-1, the 2-203-3C MSIV failed to give a half scram in reactor protection system
0 4 | channel "B". Because the logic system is designed such that the failure of one MSIV
0 5 | limit switch will not hinder the ability to scram the reactor on MSIV valve closure,
0 6 | the ability to safely shutdown the reactor was not affected as a result of this
0 7 | occurrence.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
0	9	I	A	E		B		I	N	S	T	R	U	S	Z
7	8	9	10	11	12	12	13	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SHUTDOWN METHOD		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.			
78		78		—		031		03		L		0			
21		22		23		24		25		26		27			
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER			
E		Z		Z		Z		Y		N		L			
33		34		35		36		37		38		39			
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS															

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this occurrence is designated as equipment failure. The actuator arm on

1 1 the limit switch was found to be slipping on the shaft. The immediate corrective action

1 was to inspect and adjust the actuator arm. To prevent recurrence, the set screws on

1 3 all outboard MSIV limit switches were tightened.

1 4
7 8 9

FACILITY STATUS (28) E 0 8 8 (29) NA (30) OTHER STATUS
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) B Routine Test (32) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) Z (34) Z NA (35) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (37) 0 0 0 (38) Z (39) NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (40) 0 0 0 (41) NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION (42) Z (43) NA

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (44) N (45) NA

NRC USE ONLY
78 69

2 C N (44) NA
78 69

7810170180 S
NAME OF PREPARER D. Clark
PHONE: 309-654-2241, ext 247

NRC USE ONLY

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- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 78-31/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On September 10, 1978, while performing the MSIV closure monthly scram sensor functional test, procedure QOS 250-1, the 2-203-2C MSIV failed to give a half scram in reactor protection system channel "B". Earlier, the 2C MSIV was demonstrated to provide an RPS trip in channel "A". The test was performed to de-energize the other circuit; thus, resulting in a half scram. This condition is contrary to Technical Specification Table 3.1-3. The Shift Foreman was sent into the MSIV room to adjust the limit switch actuator arm. The valve was retested and a half scram was received on RPS channel "B". All other MSIV's and limit switches were tested satisfactorily. Work request number 4152-78 was written to retighten the actuator arm on the limit switch.

There have been several incidents of misaligned scram limit switches on the MSIV's, the latest of which is reported in Unit One Reportable Occurrence Number RO 78-07/03L.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The main steam isolation valve closure scram is set to trip when the isolation valves are less than or equal to 10 percent closed from the full open position. The scram setting is designed to anticipate valve closure and scram the reactor to minimize high pressure and neutron flux transients. The logic system is designed such that the failure of one MSIV limit switch will not hinder the ability to scram the reactor on MSIV valve closure. All other MSIV's and limit switches functioned properly; thus, the ability to safely shutdown the reactor was not affected as a result of the occurrence.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence is designated as equipment failure. An investigation of the valve and limit switch revealed that the actuator arm of the limit switch was slipping on the shaft, such that the valve would not make contact with the switch when the valve was moved.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to send the Shift Foreman into the MSIV room to inspect the limit switch. The Foreman adjusted the actuator arm and the half scram was received when the valve was operated. To prevent recurrence, the Electricians tightened the set screws on all the limit switches on the outboard MSIV's.