



TU ELECTRIC

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Ref. # 10CFR50.55(e)
10CFR21

May 20, 1991

William J. Cahill, Jr.
Executive Vice President

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-446
LINEAR INDICATIONS IN 3-INCH SCH 160 PIPING
SDAR: CP-91-02 (INTERIM REPORT)

Gentlemen:

On April 18, 1991, TU Electric orally notified the NRC of a deficiency in which linear indications were found in 3-inch schedule 160 piping installed in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System. TU Electric has conservatively determined that this deficiency is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. The required information follows.

Description

As a result of a final weld inspection, linear indications were found in approximately 70.5 feet of 3-inch schedule 160 SA 106 Gr B pipe. Approximately 15.5 feet were installed in the AFW system, a 40-foot section was in the warehouse, and approximately 15 feet were in a laydown area. All of the pipe was part of an order of approximately 213.5 feet with heat number L83659 manufactured by US Steel and delivered to CPSES on August 12, 1980. The root cause of this deficiency appears to be a manufacturing defect.

Safety Implications

Several linear indications violated the manufacturers piping minimum wall thickness requirements. Had the linear indications extended deeply enough into the pipe wall to violate ASME Code minimum wall thickness, loss of system integrity could have occurred, leading to loss of safety function. TU Electric has conservatively determined this deficiency to be reportable.

Corrective Action

There are only three safety related systems at CPSES in which the suspect material may have been utilized: Auxiliary Feedwater, Component Cooling Water, and Service Water. QC reviewed the N-5 Data Reports for Unit 1 and determined that no evidence of the suspect material has been identified as being utilized for process fluid piping and welded attachments (e.g., trunnions, saddles, stanchions).

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Since N-5 data records are not yet available for Unit 2, QC reviewed the Pressure Boundary Materials database to identify any uses of the suspect material. The only use recorded in the database was the Unit 2 AFW piping spools previously identified as having the linear indications. However, since all ASME Code safety related materials for Unit 2 have not been incorporated into the database, QC has incorporated a feature into the database to alert the Pressure Boundary Materials database user whenever heat number L83659 is entered.

Pipe purchase orders are being reviewed to determine if additional piping with the same heat number has been delivered to CPSES.


An analysis performed for approximately six feet of the 15.5 feet of pipe installed in the Unit 2 AFW system determined that the material was acceptable for that particular application. The remaining 9.5 feet of pipe which was installed has been removed and scrapped. The 15 feet of suspect material located in the laydown area as well as the 40-foot piece from the warehouse have also been scrapped.

TU Electric has notified US Steel of this deficiency and a copy of this letter is being provided to US Steel.

TU Electric will submit the next report no later than October 31, 1991.

Sincerely,

William J. Cahill, Jr.

By: 
D. R. Woodlan
Docket Licensing Manager

HAM/vld

c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV
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US Steel