

NSP

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

March 2, 1978

Mr. R. F. Heishman, Chief
Reactor Construction and Engineering
Support Branch
Region III
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Heishman:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 60-263 License No. DPR-22

Your letter of February 9, 1978, identified 4 items which appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements and requested that we reply within 20 days of receipt of your letter.

The first three items concern missing records and signoffs related to feedwater nozzle clad removal and feedwater sparger installation. Our investigation indicates that the associated work was performed properly and that all required quality control signoffs were completed. Correction of documentation will be completed by March 10, 1978.

The fourth item concerns missing documentation related to CRD Nozzle Capping. The work associated with this item was also properly performed. The documentation will be corrected by March 10, 1978.

Further explanation and additional corrective actions for each item are as follows:

Item 1

General Electric Company (GE) did not maintain the Ultrasonic re-calibration and verification records while performing thickness measurement of the RPV feedwater nozzle safe-ends as required by GE procedure NSP-77-FW-09E paragraph 7.2.

Response

Calibration and/or verification was performed immediately prior to machining operation as evidenced by production and quality control signoffs in the machining procedure and travelers as follows:

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1. Machining Procedure NSP-77-FW-09H steps 7.4.2 and 7.4.3
2. Traveler CRM-45-D steps 2a and 2b
3. Traveler RCRM-45E steps 5a and 5b
4. Travelers CRM-135, CRM-225 and CRM-315 steps 14a and 14b

The ultrasonic data was taken at the reactor vessel flange area and was to be compared to the official procedures which were kept in a glove box on the refueling floor. However, this could not be done since the data sheets in the official procedure were page numbered and no sheets were provided for the recalibration or verification of the ultrasonic data. For future projects the data sheets will not be page numbered and sufficient sheets will be available

Item 2

The following GE travelers were not signed-off by Quality Control and/or Production:

- a. Sequence 8 on traveler No. CRM-45-D.
- b. Sequence 21 on traveler No. CRM-315.

Response

- 2a. The signoffs on Traveler CRM-45D were deliberately omitted to signify that the sequence was not completed in a satisfactory manner.

This sequence was to complete the safe end cut and clean the nozzle. The safe end cut was completed. However, it appeared that the finish was not acceptable. A Non-Conformance Report was written and the response was to re-machine the nozzle. Sequence 8 was then incorporated into the repair traveler as Sequence 9 and properly signed off by both production and quality control personnel.

- 2b. This signoff is for blending of the face cut to the vessel wall and was signed off by the quality control inspector. The production sign-offs are a check point prior to subsequent operations. However, that sequence was the last operation on the traveler. The omission of the signoff was an oversight that will be corrected by the appropriate production personnel.

Item 3

The following GE weld joint process control sheets were not signed-off by Quality Control and/or Production:

- a. Steps 5.d and 5.g on joint process control sheets for weld joint No. FW-135-3.1, No. FW-135-3.2 and No. FW-135-4.1 through 4.4.
- b. Step 3(b)1 on joint process control sheet for weld joint No. FW-135-5.

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Response

- 3a. Step 5d is a verification of fillet size and was signed off by quality control. However, the production check point was not signed due to oversight. This will be corrected by the appropriate production personnel.

Step 5g is the signoff for postweld cleaning and was a checkpoint for production and was not signed off due to oversight. The post weld cleaning is verified as being performed by both production and quality control on traveler SP-135-3 and by production, on procedure NSP-77-FW-15. The joint process control sheets will be corrected by the appropriate production personnel.

- 3b. The signoff for this step was indicated as a mandatory quality control signoff for the liquid penetrant inspection of the weld joint. A review of the joint process control sheet shows that the inspection was performed and the quality control signoff made in the space provided for the production signoff. This will be corrected by a notation on the joint process control sheet.

Item 4

Cherne Contracting Corporation (Cherne) liquid penetrant examination reports of weld joints No. B2104-001-0001 and No. B2104-002-0001 did not specify the material and technique used as required by Peabody procedure No. 3.23.A.1-4, paragraph No. 7.2.

Response


Notwithstanding the fact that the materials and techniques used were not recorded on the Liquid Penetrant Examination Report, certifications of the material used were included in the turnover documentation. The technique used was the visible dye - solvent removed technique. Materials used were:

Penetrant - Magnaflux Corp. SKL-HF Batch #7F012
Remover - Magnaflux Corp. SKC-NF Batch #7F038
Developer - Magnaflux Corp. SKD-NF Batch #6F052

Cherne will amend the incomplete reports. The Cherne Liquid Penetrant Examination Report form has been revised to include designated spaces for recording the material used.

Should you have any questions concerning our response, please communicate directly with the plant management.

Yours very truly,



L. J. Wachter
Vice President - Power Production
and System Operation

cc: Mr. G. Charnoff