

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Attachment to AECM-83/0522

Page 1 of 2

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CON'T

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On 1/7/83, an electrician preparing to route cable as required by a
0 3 maintenance work authorization noticed that the two wall penetrations
0 4 involved (Aux. Bldg. to Turbine Bldg.) had been previously opened. The
0 5 Control Room had not been notified prior to the work, therefore, no fire
0 6 watch was in effect as required by T.S.3.7.7.a. The event had no effect
0 7 on the health and safety of the public and did not constitute a threat
0 8 to plant safety. This is reported pursuant to T.S.6.9.1.12.b.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
A B 11 A 12 C 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16

17 LER-RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
8 3 0 0 1 0 1 X 2
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
H 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The event was due to personnel error in not giving prior notification
1 1 to the Control Room. An hourly fire watch was established upon
1 2 notification. Personnel were reinstructed on compliance to T.S.3.7.7 and
1 3 the requirement of giving prior notification to the Control Room. The
1 4 penetrations were restored on August 22, 1983.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
8 0 0 0 NA A Observation During Job

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
2 2 NA NA

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 NA

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 NA

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
2 NA

2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION
NA

8309090398 830831
PDR ADOCK 05000416
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Ron Byrd

PHONE

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 83-001/01 X-2

Mississippi Power & Light Company
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416

Technical Specification Involved: 3.7.7.a
Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.b

Event Narrative:

This is an update to previous reports submitted on January 21, 1983, and March 18, 1983. The following paragraphs describe the event.

An electrician preparing to route cable as required by a maintenance work authorization noticed that the two wall penetrations involved had already been opened. The penetrations were AE-257D and AE-258D (elevation 166 feet, Auxiliary Building to Turbine Building). He reported this to the Control Room. An LCO was entered and an hourly fire watch was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.7.a.

It was not determinable exactly when the penetration was opened as the Control Room had not been notified prior to the activity. Maintenance work had been performed on these penetrations in September, but the penetrations were resealed by October 13, 1982.

Field engineers and work planners were made aware of the problem of opening penetrations without prior notification to the Control Room as corrective action to LER 82-132/01 T-0. These penetrations were likely opened prior to the reinstruction of personnel in December, 1982.

The penetrations were restored and the LCO lifted on August 22, 1983. This is submitted as a final report.

Previous Similar Events:

LER 82-077/01 T-0
LER 82-132/01 T-0
LER 82-027/99 X-1
LER 82-031/99 X-1



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

August 31, 1983

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/L-835.0
Update Report - Wall
Penetrations Found Open
With No Fire Watch
Established
LER 83-001/01 X-2
AECM-83/0522

This letter submits an update to previous reports submitted on January 21, 1983, and May 18, 1983. The event for which the reports were submitted occurred on January 7, 1983, when an electrician preparing to route cable through two wall penetrations noticed they were already open. This was reported to the Control Room. A Limiting Condition for Operation was entered and an hourly fire watch was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.7.a. The event was reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b.

The penetrations were restored on August 22, 1983. This is a final report. Attached is LER 83-001/01 X-2 with Supplementary Information.

Yours truly,

for

L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

EBS/SHH:sap
Attachment

cc: (See Next Page)

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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Mr. T. B. Conner (w/o)
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