

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	J	S	G	S	1	(2)	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	(3)	4	1	1	1	1	(4)			(5)
7	8	9					14	15												25	26					30		57	CAT	58
		LICENSEE CODE						LICENSE NUMBER															LICENSE TYPE							

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	2	7	0	7	3	1	8	3	8	0	8	2	9	8	3	9
60	61								68	69						74	75							80
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE									

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On two separate occasions, on July 31, 1983, and August 12, 1983, the 100' Elevation

0 3 | Containment Air Lock was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered.

0 4 | In the first instance one door then the other failed surveillance testing due to

0 5 | excessive leakage. In the second case, a damaged seal was noted on the inner door.

0 6 | In all cases, the doors were closed and tagged as appropriate, and one operable door

0 7 | was maintained closed to provide containment integrity. The events constituted

0 8 | operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
		S	A	A		X		P	E	N	E	T	R	A	
		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.					
17		21		24		27		30		32					
LER RO REPORT NUMBER		83		035		03		L		0					
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
33		34		35		36		37		40		41		42	
A		G		Z		Z		0000		Y		Y		A	
18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25	
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)															

1 0 | Apparently, due to rapid operation of the door, a seal was unseated and damaged by
1 1 | subsequent operation of the door. Uneven seating of the seal in the seal groove may
1 2 | have caused one of the test failures in the first instance. The damaged seals were
1 3 | replaced in each case; on both occasions, subsequent testing was satisfactory and the
1 4 | action statement was terminated. Administrative steps to improve air lock operation
7 8 9 | are underway.

FACILITY STATUS: 1 5 C 28
% POWER: 0 0 0 29
OTHER STATUS: N/A 30
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B 31
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Surveillance testing 32

ACTIVITY		CONTENT		RELEASED		OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A		N/A			

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES		41
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	
10	10	10

7	8	9	11	12	80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY					
TYPE		DESCRIPTION			

1 9 Z (42) N/A
7 8 9 10
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8309090393 830829
830 ADCK 05000272
NRC USE ONLY

ISSUED

2	0	N	(44)
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DESCRIPTION

PDR ADDR 00000 PDR

S _____ 68 69 _____ 80

NAME OF PREPARER R. Frahm

PHONE: (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 29, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-035/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-035/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:k11 *J42*

CC: Distribution

Report Number: 83-035/03L

Report Date: 08-29-83

Occurrence Dates: 07-31-83
08-12-83

Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Systems - 100 ft. El. Containment Air Lock - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports 83-134 and 83-145.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

07-31-83 - Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1112 MWe.
08-12-83 - Mode 3 - Rx Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1338 hours, July 31, 1983, during routine power operation, surveillance testing revealed excessive leakage past the seals of the inner door of the 100 ft. El. Containment Air Lock. The associated air lock was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered. Investigation revealed that one of the door seals was damaged, and the seal was replaced. During subsequent retesting of the airlock at 1520 hours, the inner door tested satisfactorily; however the outer door failed the test due to excessive seal leakage. The air lock was subsequently satisfactorily tested with no maintenance necessary.

At 0615 hours, August 12, 1983, a Radiation Protection Technician informed the Control Room that there was a tear in one of the seals of the inner door of the 100' El. Air Lock. The airlock was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered another time. In all cases, the doors were closed and tagged as appropriate, and one operable door was maintained closed at all times to provide containment integrity. Repairs were completed and the airlock was restored to an operable status within the time interval specified by the action requirements.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Problems with seal leakage have been previously noted and are apparently due to improper operation of the air lock. Swinging the door too rapidly results in the knife edges striking the seals, moving them out of proper position. The resulting uneven seating of the knife edges causes the seals to exhibit excessive leakage during subsequent testing. Operating the door latch mechanism too rapidly or leaving the test air aligned to the seal may result in a differential pressure across the seals which can push a seal out of its seating groove. Subsequent closing of the door may result in damage to the seal. Finally, testing with 47 psig (as presently performed) does

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

not closely simulate actual seal performance; a License Change Request has been submitted to lower the pressure to a more reasonable value.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The limitations on closure for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on containment integrity and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3 requires:

With an air lock inoperable, restore the air lock to operable status within 24 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

As noted, in each case, the air lock was returned to an operable status in a timely fashion, and one door was maintained operable at all times. No undue risk to the health or safety of the public was therefore involved in the occurrence. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The seals on the 100 ft. El. Air Lock inner door were replaced. An inspection of the outer door revealed no evident problems; at 2000 hours, July 31, 1983, the air lock was retested with both doors exhibiting satisfactory leakage rates. The air lock was declared operable, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was terminated. In the second instance, the failed seal was replaced, the air lock was satisfactorily tested, and at 1640 hours, August 12, 1983, the action statement was terminated for a second time.

To improve operation of the air lock doors, existing air lock training of personnel will be reinforced. A review will be conducted to more clearly identify department responsibilities for operation and testing of the air locks, and appropriate changes will be made to administrative and procedural controls (see Unit 2 LER 83-034/03L).

FAILURE DATA:

Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.
Personnel Air Lock
Door Seal

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-111B