

**GPU Nuclear**

100 Interpace Parkway
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054
201 263-6500
TELEX 136-482
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

September 1, 1983

Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Crutchfield;

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
SEP Topic No. VI-7.C.1, Appendix K -
Electrical Instrumentation and Control Rereview

At Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station there are five (5) automatic bus transfers (ABT) and two (2) auto-contact transfers (ACT) in the vital AC distribution system. During the integrated assessment of the subject SEP topic, the NRC staff recommended that these ABT/ACTs be removed or the circuits be otherwise modified to ensure that faulted loads will not be transferred.

By letter dated May 28, 1982, GPU Nuclear proposed to perform a coordinated load and circuit breaker analysis to assure proper coordinated protection of the circuits to and from the existing ABT/ACTs. The attached report (Oyster Creek Vital AC System Automatic Bus Transfer Switches, Coordination Study) summarizes our recent study of the protective devices. The study reviews each ABT/ACT circuit individually for its effect on the electrical independence of the vital AC distribution system. The evaluation is based on the adequacy of protective devices and their coordination for a fault downstream of the ABT/ACT.

The results of the evaluation establish that each protective device is adequately applied and even though a fault could be transferred by an ABT/ACT from one power train to another, the protective devices will prevent the loss of redundant safety loads. A fault anywhere on a circuit to or from an ABT/ACT, thus will not cause the loss of power to the redundant safety loads.


Additionally, the results of our probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) indicate that the automatic transfer switches in the vital AC distribution system do not contribute in any significant way to the failure probability of any key mitigation system and, consequently, to the core melt frequency.

8309070125 830901
PDR ADOCK 05000219
C PDR

A035
11

It is, therefore, concluded that removal of the ABT/ACTs or modification of the circuit is not considered necessary.

Very truly yours,



P. B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

lr

cc: Administrator
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731