

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | A | L | B | R | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

CONT

01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 3 | R | 0 | 7 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During performance of SI 4.2.J.2.B (Biaxial Seismic Switches Channel-
03 | Functional Test and Calibration) switches B and C would not operate
04 | within the limits specified in T. S. 3.2.J.1. The problem was discovered
05 | on 7/1/83 and the switches were returned to service on 7/6/83. Seismic
06 | values above the T. S. setpoint initiate control room alarm. There was
07 | no danger to the health or safety of the public. Switch A was operable
08 | and within acceptable limits during the event.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | I | E | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | E | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | S | 15 | Z | 16 |
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 3 | 21 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 3 | 9 | 23 24 25 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 26 27 28 | REPORT TYPE | L | 29 30 | REVISION | 0 | 31 32
ACTION TAKEN | A | 18 | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 23 24 25 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 26 27 | NPD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 28 29 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | L | 30 31 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | K | 1 | 3 | 0 | 32 33 34 35

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Switches B and C are Kinometrics model HS-3's. Switch B was found to have
11 | a faulty output transistor on its amplifier board and switch C had a dirty
12 | potentiometer. The transistor and potentiometer were replaced and the
13 | switches were returned to service. This is considered to be a random event
14 | and no further recurrence control is required.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | H | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Surveillance Testing | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION | N | 44 | 8308050365 830728
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
PDR ADOCK 05000259
S PDR

NAME OF OPERATOR G. T. Chambers

PHONE (205) 729-0841

IE 22

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83039 Technical Specification Involved 3.2.J
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) Date Due NRC 07/31/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was at 0% power in a refueling outage. Units 2 and 3 were both operating at 98% power. All 3 units were affected by this event. During performance of SI 4.2.J.2.B (Biaxial Seismic Switches Channel-Functional Test and Calibration) it was discovered that switches B and C would not operate within acceptable limits. Switch B operated at approximately .6g and switch C would not operate within the limits of the test instrumentation. T. S. 3.2.J specifies a measurement range of 0.025 to 0.25g and a setpoint of 0.1g for the biaxial switches. Seismic values above the T. S. setpoint initiate a control room alarm. A 30 day LCO was entered. The switches were discovered on 7/1/83 and returned to service on 7/6/83, following completion of SI 4.2.J.2.B. There was no danger to the health or safety of the public because switch A was fully operable and within the limits of Tech. Spec. 3.2.J.

Kinematics switches B and C (model HS-3) were found to have a faulty output transistor and a dirty potentiometer, respectively. The transistor and potentiometer were replaced and the switches returned to service. This was a random event and no further recurrence control is required.

* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

83 AUG 2 AIO: 26
JULY 28, 1963

83 AUG 2 AIO: 02

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/83039

The enclosed report provides details concerning two biaxial seismic
switches that would not operate within technical specification limits.
This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1 Technical
Specification 6.7.2.b.(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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