

CONTROL BLOCK (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 C A S 0 5 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 7 0 5 2 9 8 3 8 0 6 2 8 8 3 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With the plant in Mode 1 and during surveillance testing in accordance with

03 Procedure S023-3-3.2, Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Channel C was declared

04 inoperable at 1120 and placed in the bypassed condition when the Thermal Power

05 Calibration (TPC) constant was found to be outside the allowable range. Since

06 the Reactor Protection System (RPS) contains 4 CPC channels and only 3 channels

07 (all of which remained functional throughout the event) are required for operab-

08 ility, there was no impact on health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

09 I A 11 E 12 A 13 I N S T R U 14 X 15 Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 18 0 6 1 19 0 3 20 L 21 0 2

22 8 3 23 0 6 1 24 0 3 25 L 26 0 2

27 8 3 28 0 6 1 29 0 3 30 L 31 0 2

32 8 3 33 0 6 1 34 0 3 35 L 36 0 2

37 8 3 38 0 6 1 39 0 3 40 L 41 0 2

42 8 3 43 0 6 1 44 0 3 45 L 46 0 2

47 8 3 48 0 6 1 49 0 3 50 L 51 0 2

52 8 3 53 0 6 1 54 0 3 55 L 56 0 2

57 8 3 58 0 6 1 59 0 3 60 L 61 0 2

62 8 3 63 0 6 1 64 0 3 65 L 66 0 2

67 8 3 68 0 6 1 69 0 3 70 L 71 0 2

72 8 3 73 0 6 1 74 0 3 75 L 76 0 2

77 8 3 78 0 6 1 79 0 3 80 L 81 0 2

82 8 3 83 0 6 1 84 0 3 85 L 86 0 2

87 8 3 88 0 6 1 89 0 3 90 L 91 0 2

92 8 3 93 0 6 1 94 0 3 95 L 96 0 2

97 8 3 98 0 6 1 99 0 3 100 L 101 0 2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (27)

10 Inoperability of CPC Channel C was attributed to Loop 2A Cold Leg Temperature

11 Resistance to Current Converter 2TT-9179-3 being out of calibration. This

12 condition allowed slow instrument drift and in this case, the loop T-cold indication

13 apparently drifted low resulting in an out-of-range TPC value. After recalibration

14 of T-cold, CPC Channel C was declared operable in accordance with Procedure

15 S023-3-3.25 at 1425 on May 29, 1983. (See Attachment)

16 FACILITY STATUS 17 0 8 0 18 NA 19 B 20 Surveillance Testing

21 0 8 0 22 NA 23 B 24 Surveillance Testing

25 0 8 0 26 NA 27 B 28 Surveillance Testing

29 0 8 0 30 NA 31 B 32 Surveillance Testing

33 0 8 0 34 NA 35 B 36 Surveillance Testing

37 0 8 0 38 NA 39 B 40 Surveillance Testing

41 0 8 0 42 NA 43 B 44 Surveillance Testing

45 0 8 0 46 NA 47 B 48 Surveillance Testing

49 0 8 0 50 NA 51 B 52 Surveillance Testing

53 0 8 0 54 NA 55 B 56 Surveillance Testing

57 0 8 0 58 NA 59 B 60 Surveillance Testing

61 0 8 0 62 NA 63 B 64 Surveillance Testing

65 0 8 0 66 NA 67 B 68 Surveillance Testing

69 0 8 0 70 NA 71 B 72 Surveillance Testing

73 0 8 0 74 NA 75 B 76 Surveillance Testing

77 0 8 0 78 NA 79 B 80 Surveillance Testing

81 0 8 0 82 NA 83 B 84 Surveillance Testing

85 0 8 0 86 NA 87 B 88 Surveillance Testing

89 0 8 0 90 NA 91 B 92 Surveillance Testing

93 0 8 0 94 NA 95 B 96 Surveillance Testing

97 0 8 0 98 NA 99 B 100 Surveillance Testing

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 18 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 78 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 93 0 0 0 94 0 0 0 95 0 0 0 96 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 98 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 100 0 0 0

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 19 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 78 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 93 0 0 0 94 0 0 0 95 0 0 0 96 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 98 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 100 0 0 0

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 20 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 78 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 93 0 0 0 94 0 0 0 95 0 0 0 96 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 98 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 100 0 0 0

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 21 N 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

21 NAME OF PREPARER H. B. RAY 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PHONE 714/492-7700

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-061
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO. 2, DOCKET NO. 50-361

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Further investigation into the cause of this occurrence revealed that the out of calibration condition was caused by a faulty range resistor in the T-cold indication circuit for Loop 2A. This resistor was replaced on June 6, 1983.

As further corrective action to prevent recurrence of this event, a program has been implemented to monitor the plant computer on a regular basis to identify failure trends early. Using this program, any significant trends will be investigated by Instrumentation and Controls personnel for repair or preventative maintenance calibrations, as appropriate.

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

RECEIVED
NRC

SCE

REGION VISE

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

June 28, 1983

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J.B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 83-061
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-10 for San Onofre Unit 2, this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and a copy of the Licensee Event Report (LER) form for an occurrence involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 associated with the Reactor Protection System (RPS). Enclosed LER 83-061 addresses this event, including corrective actions and measures to prevent recurrence.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,

HE Maza

Enclosure

June 28, 1983

cc: A.E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)
R.J. Pate (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)
J.P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)