NRC FORM 366 (12-81)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011 EXPIRES 4-30-82

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	Licensee Code (2)	SCNEE1
01	License Number (3)	00-00000-00
01	License Type (4)	41111
01	CAT (5)	
01 CON'T	Report Source (6)	L
01	Docket Number (7)	0500026 9
01	Event Date (8)	052583
01	Report Date (9)	062483

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On May 25, 1983 at 1542, a lockout indication was received for start-up transformer CT3. This made the overhead emergency power path from Keowee inoperable. The alternate power path was immediately verified. Power was available at all times. It was determined that this would cause no damage or excessive pressure on the Reactor Coolant System. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Line	Field	Value
09	System Code (11)	EA
09	Cause Code (12)	X
09	Cause Subcode (13)	Z
09	Component Code (14)	ZZZZZZ
09	Comp. Subcode (15)	Z
09	Valve Subcode (16)	Z
(17) LER/RO Report Number	Event Year	83
	Sequential Report No.	011
	Occurrence Code	03
	Report Type	L
	Revision No.	0
	Action Taken (18)	X
	Future Action (19)	X
	Effect on Plant (20)	Z
	Shutdown Method (21)	Z
	Hours (22)	0000
	Attachment Submitted (23)	N
	NPRD-4 Form Sub. (24)	Y
	Prime Comp. Supplier (25)	Z
	Component Manufacturer (26)	Z999

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause of this occurrence is unknown. Testing of this system's components revealed no failures or problems. There was speculation of a possible moisture buildup or of a cracked insulator. Further testing will be done during the next extended Unit 3 shutdown. CT 4 was verified, and CT5 was used also as standby. At 2240 CT3 was energized and power was restored.

Line	Field	Value
15	Facility Status (28)	X
15	% Power (29)	XXX
15	Other Status (30)	Varied status
15	Method of Discovery (31)	A
15	Discovery Description (32)	Operator observation
16	Activity Released (33)	Z
16	Content of Release (34)	Z
16	Amount of Activity (35)	NA
16	Location of Release (36)	NA
17	Personnel Exposures Number (37)	000
17	Type (38)	Z
17	Description (39)	NA
18	Personnel Injuries Number (40)	000
18	Description (41)	NA
19	Loss of or Damage to Facility Type (42)	Z
19	Description (43)	NA
20	Publicity Issued (44)	N
20	Description (45)	NA

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NAME OF PREPARER Jocelyn C. Petty PHONE: (704) 373-8270

Duke Power Company
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-269/83-11

Report Date: June 24, 1983

Occurrence Date: May 25, 1983

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Lockout of start-up transformer CT3 caused the overhead emergency power path from Keowee to be inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
Oconee 1 100%
Oconee 2 Cold shutdown
Oconee 3 92%

Description of Occurrence: On May 25, 1983 at 1542, a fault was indicated in the Unit 3 start-up bus between the start-up transformer CT3 and the feeder breakers 3TA and 3TB. This caused the lockout of the start-up transformer CT3. This lockout cleared and de-energized CT3, its 230 kilovolt power circuit breakers (PCB), its 6900 and 4160 volt switchgear breakers, and all associated bus work. This made the overhead emergency power path from Keowee inoperable, and constituted a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.7.2(a).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is unknown. All tests performed showed no problems and did not reveal the cause of the fault which caused the lockout. It was suggested that there may have been a possibility of a moisture buildup that cleared itself with an electrical flash. Also suggested was the possibility of a cracked insulator. Further shutdown testing will follow.

Analysis of Occurrence: Technical Specification 3.7.2(a) permits the operation of a unit for 72 hours upon the loss of one independent on-site emergency power path, provided the alternate power path is verified operable within one hour of the loss and every eight hours thereafter. This was done. Both power sources were operable within 7 hours of CT3's lockout. During this period of time, the 4.16 KV auxiliary system was operable. Therefore, power was available to the equipment required to bring the reactor to a hot shutdown. The Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report 15.8 reviewed the loss of power accidents and determined that it would not result in any fuel damage or excessive pressures on the Reactor Coolant System. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action was to energize the standby bus through the standby transformer CT4, which verified the alternate path as required per Technical Specification 3.7.2(a). Standby power was transferred from CT4 to standby transformer CT5, which is supplied by combustion turbines located at the Lee Steam Station, as an extra precautionary measure. Testing was done to try to determine the cause of the lockout. A bus high potential test, a bus doble test, a relay test, and circuit breaker tests, were performed. No problems were noted. At 2240, CT3 was energized and power was restored to the start-up bus. Further testing to determine if there still is a problem will be performed during the next extended Unit 3 shutdown.

DUKE POWER COMPANY
P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

June 24, 1983

July 1

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/83-11. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker /TSS

Hal B. Tucker

JCP/php

Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. J. C. Bryant
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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