

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

NRC USE ONLY

** (205) 729-0891 **
PHONE: _____

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83029 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.B.3

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2)* Date Due NRC 07/04/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in a refueling outage, unit 2 was operating normally at 56 percent power, and unit 3 was operating normally at 100 percent power. All three units were affected by this event. The Standby Gas Treatment System is common to units 1, 2, and 3. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.7.B.1, Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test, the relative humidity control heater failed to operate as required due to erratic operation of the flow switches. Erratic flow switch operation was due to low air flow and turbulence at the switch. The Standby Treatment "B" Train was declared inoperable (Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 and Technical Specification Table 3.2.A). There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 allows operation for 7 days with one train inoperable. Standby Gas Treatment Trains "A" and "C" were operable and available. "B" Train was inoperable for about 12 hours. Damper 0-65-503 was adjusted to increase train flow within the limits of Technical Specification 3.7.B.2.C and to reduce turbulence in order to cause positive flow switch operation. This flow switch problem is limited to "B" Train due to the type and location of the flow switches with respect to damper location and position. The paddle type flow switches on Trains "A" and "B" are expected to be replaced and relocated with more reliable and sensitive differential pressure switches similar to those installed on "C" Train by February 15, 1984. Until these switches are replaced the "B" train flow will be adjusted to maximum flow not exceeding 9900 cfm. This will ensure positive flow switch operation. SI 4.7.B-7 will be revised to include this adjustment by August 1, 1983.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/83018

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

USNRO REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
83 JUN 31 9:49

June 30, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/83029

The enclosed report provides details concerning standby gas treatment
train "B" which was inoperable because of an erratic flow switch. This
report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1 Technical
Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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