

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 P A S E S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 58

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 7 0 5 2 7 8 3 8 0 6 2 4 8 3 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While at 40% power, the 'A' Containment H₂/O₂ Analyzers were found to have erratic
03 readings. The analyzers were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Spec-
04 ification 3.3.7.5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. There were no adverse con-
05 sequences in that the 'B' Analyzers were available and operating properly. This
06 event is similar to LER 83-053/03L-0.

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09 S E 11 E 12 B 13 P U M P X X 14 C 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22 0 8 7 23 24 25 26 0 3 27 28 29 L 30 31 0 32
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

ACTION TAKEN 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 N 24 A 25 D 0 9 6 26
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Upon inspection of the 'A' analyzer components, the pressure control valve and
11 sample pump were found to be degraded to a point where proper flow could not be
12 maintained. The failed components were replaced and the system calibrated and de-
13 clared operable. An engineering review has been tasked with determining the long
14 term resolution.

15 B 28 0 4 0 29 NA 30 A 31 Operator Observation 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

18 0 0 0 40 NA 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

19 Z 42 NA 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

20 N 44 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

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PDR ADOCK 05000387
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J.J. Todd

PHONE (717) 542-2181 X3240

ATTACHMENT

LER # 83-087/03L-0

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Docket Number: 50-387

While at 40% power, the "A" Containment H_2/O_2 analyzers were found to have erratic readings. The analyzers were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.7.5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. There were no adverse consequences in that the "B" analyzers were operable and operated properly. This event is similar to LER 83-053/03L-0, which was written about the "B" containment H_2/O_2 analyzers.

The suspect components, the pressure control valve and sample pump, were inspected and found to be degraded to a point where proper flow could not be maintained. The valve and pump were replaced and the "A" Containment H_2/O_2 analyzers were returned to service and declared operable.

It is believed that previous operation of the H_2/O_2 analyzers in a non-inerted containment during the Power Ascension Testing program caused accelerated degradation of the system components. With the higher than normal concentration of oxygen in the containment, abnormal amounts of moisture were present in the system. This coupled with the amount of outage activities in the containment (grinding, welding, insulation work, etc.) allowed quantities of particulate to accumulate in various components and restricted flow.

The sample pump will be sent to Comsip-Delphi for failure analysis. The Nuclear Plant Engineering group has been contacted and asked to investigate and evaluate the life expectancy of the H_2/O_2 analyzers sample pumps and other system components. The question of equipment design versus equipment application is also a part of the engineering review.

The method of operation has been changed to keep one channel of analyzers in the standby mode while the other channel is kept in continuous analyze.

The information from the engineering review being made will be applied to both channels of the H_2/O_2 analyzers. This LER will be updated when the engineering review is completed.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101 • 215 / 770-5151

June 24, 1983

Mr. J.M. Allan
Acting Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-087/03L-0
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-1729

Dear Mr. Allan:

Attached please find a copy of Licensee Event Report No. 83-087/03L-0. This event was determined to be reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b, in that the 'A' channel of Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen analyzers was found to have erratic readings and declared inoperable. This event is similar to LER 83-053/03L-0 and an engineering review is in progress to determine proper system design versus application. An update to this LER will be forthcoming.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

JTT/pjg

attachment

cc: G.G. Rhoads
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Washington, DC 20555

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