

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 S C N E E 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CON'T

01 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 5 3 1 8 3 0 6 3 0 8 3 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On May 31, 1983 at 1553, the "2A" MDEFDW pump became inoperable when power was re-

03 moved from its circuitry so that the automatic initiation switch (for low discharge

04 pressure) 2PS-388, could be repaired. While this pump was inoperable, the main

05 feedwater system, the "2B" MDEFDWP, and the TDEFDWP and emergency feedwater from

06 the other two units, were available. The removal of the "2A" MDEFDWP was a planned

07 action, and appropriate plans were made. Therefore, the health and safety of the

08 public were not endangered.

09 SYSTEM CODE C H 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE E 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE S 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

17 LER/RC REPORT NUMBER 8 3 18 ACTION TAKEN A 19 FUTURE ACTION Z 20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 22 HOURS 0 0 0 0 23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 7 5 3

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The root cause was component failure. The switch developed a small hole which

11 allowed water in its circuitry causing it to fail. To repair this switch, power

12 had to be removed from the pump, making the pump inoperable. The switch was re-

13 placed, calibrated, and was determined to be functional. The "2A" MDEFDWP was

14 declared operable at 0955 on June 1, 1983.

15 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Planned inoperability 32

33 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

16 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

17 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

18 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

19 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45

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USNRC REGION II
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HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

83 JUL 8 A 9:52
June 30, 1983

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/83-08. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H. B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

JCP/pbp

Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

INPO Records Center
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Mr. J. C. Bryant
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Duke Power Company
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-270/83-08

Report Date: June 30, 1983

Occurrence Date: May 31, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: The "2A" MDEFDWP Pump was made inoperable when power was removed to repair a switch.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On May 31, 1983 at 1553, the "2A" Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (MDEFDWP) became inoperable when power was removed from its circuitry. Power was removed to facilitate repair of the "2B" Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure Switch 2PS-388.

While performing the monthly safety related functional test of the MDEFDWP initiation pressure switches, pressure switch 2PS-388 failed. This switch is part of the auto-initiation circuitry for the "2A" MDEFDWP. When this switch is inoperable, it would prevent the "2A" MDEFDWP from automatically starting on low discharge pressure indication for both main feedwater pumps. To repair the switch, the breaker for the control circuitry for the subject pump was removed. This made the "2A" MDEFDWP inoperable and constituted operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.4.2(a).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The root cause of this occurrence is a component failure. Because the switch failed, the "2A" MDEFDWP had to be made inoperable to repair the switch and to restore the portion of automatic initiation capability that was lost back to the pump system. A small hole was found in the bellows of the switch which allowed water from the pressure line to get into the circuitry compartment causing it to fail when tested. During the previous monthly test, all of the "2A" MDEFDWP system met the required criteria.

Analysis of Occurrence: At the time "2A" MDEFDWP was inoperable, the main feedwater system was operable for decay heat removal and cooldown above 250°F. Also available to meet the same requirements were the "2B" MDEFDWP pump, the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and emergency feedwater from the other two units. The removal of "2A" MDEFDWP was a planned action by Operations personnel. Appropriate plans for actions to be taken, if an event took place while "2A" MDEFDWP was inoperable, were made. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action: Pressure switch 2PS-388 was replaced with a new one. The new switch was calibrated and a functional test was made of the "2A" MDEFDWP auto-initiation circuitry. The "2A" MDEFDWP was declared operable at 0955 on June 1, 1983.