

1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

0 1 C I O F S V I 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 2 0 4 5

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: 01 L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 7 0 7 2 4 8 0 8 0 6 2 2 8 3 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

During July testing, one of the twelve helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switch units was discovered to have a trip point outside the limits of LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3. During August's testing, four of the twelve switch units were found to trip outside these limits. These are reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2. No affect on public health or safety. Redundant system available and operable. Similar reports are RO's 77-47, 78-27, 79-32, 79-56, 80-07, 80-16, 80-20, 80-26, and 80-34.

SYSTEM CODE C B (11)		CAUSE CODE E (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE E (13)		COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U (14)				COMP. SUBCODE S (15)		VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)	
EVENT YEAR 8 0 (17)		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 1 (18)		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 (19)		REPORT TYPE X (20)		REVISION NO. 2 (21)					
ACTION TAKEN X (22)		FUTURE ACTION X (23)		EFFECT ON PLANT Z (24)		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (25)		HOURS 0 0 0 0 (26)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (27)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y (28)	
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (29)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 0 8 0 (30)											

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 ITT Barton Model 289 pressure differential switches failed to actuate at trip point

1 1 due to dirt accumulation in electrical switches. The ITT Barton pressure differential

1 2 indicating switches were replaced with ITT Barton Model 752 pressure transmitters and

1 3 bistable trip modules (Model PT-3D, manufactured by General Atomic Company) via Change

1 4 Notice 1110. No further corrective action is anticipated or required.

7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS (1) (5) (C) (28) % POWER (0) (4) (0) (29) OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (C) (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operability Test

7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (1) (6) (Z) (33) (Z) (34) N/A AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1	7	000	Z	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8 0 0 0 (40) N/A
8307010041 830622
H005

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 Z (42) N/A
PDR ADOCK 05000267
S PDR

7 8 9

PUBLICITY

ISSUED (2) (0) (N) (44) DESCRIPTION (45) N/A

68 69 70

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

PHONE: (303) 785-2224




Public Service Company of Colorado

16805 Road 19 1/2. Platteville, Colorado 80651-9298

50-267

June 22, 1983
Fort St. Vrain
Unit No. 1
P-83219

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator
Region IV
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011



Reference: Facility Operating License
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Collins:

Enclosed please find a copy of Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/80-41, Revised Final, submitted per the requirements of Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

Also, please find enclosed one copy of the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/80-41.

Very truly yours,

Don Warembourg
Don Warembourg
Manager, Nuclear Production


DW/cl's

Enclosure

cc: Director, MIPC

H005
1/1

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE DISTRIBUTION



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Department of Energy - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
San Francisco Operations Office
ATTN: California Patent Group
1333 Broadway
Oakland, California 94612

Department of Energy - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
Mr. Glen A. Newby, Chief
HTR Branch
Division of Nuclear Power Development
Mail Station B-107
Washington, D.C. 20545

Department of Energy - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
Project Manager
ATTN: Dr. Beighley
P. O. Box 81608
San Diego, CA 92138

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator - - - - - 1 (Original of P Letter)
Region IV
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

Mr. Philip C. Wagner, Project Manager - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
Region IV
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

Director - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
Office of Management Information and Program Control
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

INPO Records Center - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. Mike Dolphin, FSV, CA Technologies, Inc. Site Representative - - - - - 1 (P Letter)
General Atomic Technologies, Inc.
16864 Weld County Road 19 1/2
Platteville, Colorado 80651

NRC Resident Site Inspector - - - - - 1 (P Letter)

REPORT DATE: June 22, 1983

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-41
ISSUE 2

OCCURRENCE DATE: July 24, 1980

Page 1 of 5

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/80-41/03-X-2

Revised Final

IDENTIFICATION OF
OCCURRENCE:

During the July performance of the monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that one of twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

During the August performance of the monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that four of the twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

This is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT
DESCRIPTION:

During normal plant operation, instrument personnel performed the circulator seal malfunction (buffer-mid-buffer) switch operability check. The switches are normally calibrated on an annual basis; however, due to the problems cited in the previous reports as listed on the LER, a check of buffer-mid-buffer trip settings on a monthly basis was undertaken as an interim measure to test operability.

There are twelve buffer-mid-buffer switch units, three per circulator. Each switch unit contains two electrical switches. The range of the sensing element is from (-) 100 inches of water to zero to (+) 100 inches of water. One of the electrical switches in each unit must operate at greater than or equal to (-) 10 inches water (negative buffer-mid-buffer), and the other electrical switch must operate at less than or equal to (+) 80 inches water (positive buffer-mid-buffer) per Table 4.4-3.

The trip settings for the twelve switch units are listed in Table 1 for July and in Table 2 for August.

The switch settings which were found to be less conservative than those established by the Technical Specification did not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of the system.

CAUSE
DESCRIPTION:

Dirt buildup and accumulation in the electrical switches prevented them from making proper contact.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

The trip settings of the electrical switches were re-adjusted to the proper trip points.

Due to the continuing problems being experienced with the electrical switches, the interim check of the trip settings was conducted on a monthly basis.

The problem was investigated, and the process activated pressure differential switches were replaced with pressure differential transmitters and solid state dual bistable trip modules. The new units eliminate the use of electrical contacts and, therefore, reduce the probability of fouling by dirt and/or corrosion from the working environment. This modification was performed via Public Service Company Change Notice 1110.

No further corrective actions are anticipated or required.

TABLE 1

		As Found Inches H ₂ O		As Left Inches H ₂ O	
		Increasing Trip Point	Decreasing Trip Point	Increasing Trip Point	Decreasing Trip Point
1A Circulator	PDIS-21149	+76	- 8	+76	-8
	PDIS-21151	+78	- 8	+78	-8
	PDIS-21153	+75	- 5	+75	-5
1B Circulator	PDIS-21155	+77	- 6	+73	-6
	PDIS-21157	+73	-30 ①	+72	-5
	PDIS-21159	+72	- 8	+77	-8
1C Circulator	PDIS-21150	+75	- 5	+75	-5
	PDIS-21152	+75	- 7	+75	-7
	PDIS-21154	+75	- 3	+75	-3
1D Circulator	PDIS-21156	+73	- 7	+73	-7
	PDIS-21158	+74	- 6	+74	-6
	PDIS-21160	+75	- 8	+75	-8

① Denotes switch which was out of tolerance.

TABLE 2

		As Found Inches H ₂ O		As Left Inches H ₂ O	
		Increasing Trip Point	Decreasing Trip Point	Increasing Trip Point	Decreasing Trip Point
1A Circulator	PDIS-21149	+75	- 5	+75	-5
	PDIS-21151	+77	- 8	+77	-8
	PDIS-21153	+73	-17 ①	+73	-6
1B Circulator	PDIS-21155	+82 ①	- 6	+78	-6
	PDIS-21157	+77	- 7	+77	-7
	PDIS-21159	+77	- 9	+77	-9
1C Circulator	PDIS-21150	+78	- 4	+78	-4
	PDIS-21152	+77	- 9	+77	-9
	PDIS-21154	+77	- 8	+77	-8
1D Circulator	PDIS-21156	+73	-50 ①	+73	-5
	PDIS-21158	+75	- 7	+75	-7
	PDIS-21160	+75	-47 ①	+75	-9


① Denotes switches which were out of tolerance.

Prepared By:




Robert A. Dickerson
Senior Technical Services Technician

Reviewed By:




Frank J. Novachek
Technical Services Engineering Supervisor

Reviewed By:



L. M. McBride
Station Manager

Approved By:



Don Warembourg
Manager, Nuclear Production