NRC FORM 366
(7-77) U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Field	Entry
01 Licensee Code (2)	N J S G S 1
License Number (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
License Type (4)	4 1 1 1 1
CAT (5)	
CON'T 01 Report Source (6)	L
Docket Number (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 2
Event Date (8)	0 5 0 7 8 3
Report Date (9)	0 6 0 1 8 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On May 7, 1983, during routine shutdown operations, the No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator was tagged out due to a broken differential current relay. The generator was declared inoperable and with No. 1C Diesel tagged out for maintenance, Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were entered. The redundant generator was operable. Operations involving positive reactivity changes were suspended and containment integrity was already established. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

System Code (11)	Cause Code (12)	Cause Subcode (13)	Component Code (14)	Comp. Subcode (15)	Valve Subcode (16)
E E	A	F	R E L A Y X	A	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

Event Year		Sequential Report No.		Occurrence Code	Report Type		Revision No.
8 3	—	0 2 1	/	0 3	L	—	0

Action Taken (18)	Future Action (19)	Effect on Plant (20)	Shutdown Method (21)	Hours (22)	Attachment Submitted (23)	NPRD-4 Form Sub. (24)	Prime Comp. Supplier (25)	Component Manufacturer (26)
B	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The 1A Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable due to possible inoperability of a control relay mechanism caused by personnel accidentally breaking glass cover, the relay was cleaned and tested satisfactorily. Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were terminated at 1115 hours, May 8, 1983.

Facility Status (28)	% Power (29)	Other Status (30)	Method of Discovery (31)	Discovery Description (32)
G	0 0 0	N/A	A	Notification by Security

Activity Released (33)	Content of Release (34)	Amount of Activity (35)	Location of Release (36)
Z	Z	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

Number (37)	Type (38)	Description (39)
0 0 0	Z	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

Number (40)	Description (41)
0 0 0	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

Type (42)	Description
Z	N/A

PUBLICITY

Issued (44)	Description (45)
N	

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NRC USE ONLY

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NAME OF PREPARER R. Frahm

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GPO 917-926

PSE&G

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 2, 1983

Mr. J. Allan
Acting Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Allan

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-021/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-021/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks

CC: Distribution

IE22

Report Number: 83-021/03L

Report Date: 06-01-83

Occurrence Date: 05-07-83

Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Electrical Power Sources - No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-080.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2100 hours, May 7, 1983, during routine shutdown operations, the Senior Shift Supervisor was informed that the protective glass cover on the No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator differential current relay had been accidentally broken by a security guard stationed in the Diesel Generator Control Room. Inspection revealed that a piece of the broken glass was lodged in the relay mechanism, possibly preventing the proper operation of the device. The diesel generator was accordingly tagged out to prevent operation. Since No. 1C Diesel Generator was tagged out for maintenance, two generators were inoperable, and at 2332 hours, May 7, 1983, Technical Specification Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were entered.

No. 1B Diesel Generator was started to demonstrate operability in accordance with Operations Directive OD-10. Operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes were suspended while both generators were inoperable. Containment integrity was established at the time of the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the incident revealed the security guard had inadvertently fallen backward, striking the relay cover and breaking the glass. A temporary post had been established in the diesel room due to the modification of Door 33, which was being fitted with an automatic fire door in accordance with Design Change Request 1EC-1333.

The training program for security guards presently addresses the importance of avoiding contact with plant equipment; the individual involved was aware of the significance of his actions. Problems of this type had not been commonly observed, and it was therefore concluded that the event was an isolated accident.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that the facility can be maintained in the shutdown and refueling condition for extended time periods and sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.

Action Statement 3.8.1.2 requires:

> With less than two diesel generators operable, suspend all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes until two generators are restored to an operable status.

Action Statement 3.8.2.2 requires:

> With less than two A.C. electrical bus trains operable and aligned to an operable diesel generator, establish containment integrity within 8 hours.

As noted, the redundant diesel generator was operable throughout the occurrence. Appropriate action was taken to insure the core remained in a stable condition and to maintain containment integrity. The event therefore involved no risk to the health and safety of the public. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As mentioned, appropriate action was taken in compliance with the action statements. The relay was cleaned and satisfactorily tested. No. 1A Diesel Generator was declared operable and at 1115 hours. May 8, 1983, Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were terminated. The glass cover was subsequently replaced to complete the repair of the relay.

The individual involved was counseled concerning the incident. The occurrence was discussed at the security pre-duty briefing on all shifts to reinforce training in this area. The post was moved to a physical location which was not immediately adjacent to the equipment in the room.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm

General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-074