

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

PHONE: (609) 935-6000 Ext. 3078



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 2, 1983

Mr. J. Allan
Acting Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Allan

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-020/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.c, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-020/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.", is written above the typed name.

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *857*

CC: Distribution

Report Number: 83-020/03L
Report Date: 06-01-83
Occurrence Date: 05-06-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Hot Leg Resistance Temperature Device Bypass Line - Spring Hangers
- Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-081.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1720 hours, May 6, 1983, during routine shutdown operations, the Senior Shift Supervisor was notified that pins had been found installed in 2 spring hangers supporting the resistance temperature device (RTD) bypass lines on Nos. 11 and 13 Reactor Coolant Loops. Hangers C-11-PRH-199 and C-13-PRH-207 were involved.

The pins had been inserted in the hangers on October 15, 1982, during the previous refueling outage. The plant had been subsequently returned to operation on February 22, 1983. On February 25, 1983, the unit was shutdown for unrelated reasons. The pins were removed prior to unit startup on May 20, 1983.

Engineering evaluation revealed that, with the pins installed in the hangers, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) would still have performed as analyzed in a design basis accident. It was also concluded that no stress damage to RCS piping occurred as the result of the incident.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

During the refueling, lead shielding had been hung from the RTD bypass lines in order to reduce radiation levels and personnel dose rates in the vicinity of the steam generators. Prior to installation of the shielding, analyses had been performed to insure proper shielding support and the prevention of damage to the system piping. The hangers had accordingly been pinned to insure that the hanger springs were not damaged. Following removal of the shielding for plant startup, the pins had been inadvertently left in place.

The dose reduction efforts were part of an improved station ALARA program; due to the program being in the early stages of development, a complete set of formal procedures had not yet been implemented. The incident was therefore viewed as involving an isolated oversight associated with inadequate procedural controls during the startup

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

phase of the program.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. Operability of piping supports (spring or static hangers, snubbers, shock suppressors, etc.) is necessary to insure the integrity of the related supported system during a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

As noted, engineering evaluation revealed that the inoperability of the spring hangers would not have resulted in a loss of integrity of the RCS piping during a design basis event, and that no degradation of the system occurred as the result of operation with the pins installed. The occurrence therefore involved no risk to the health or safety of the public. Due to the inadequate implementation of procedural controls involved, however, the incident is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9c.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The hanger pins were removed on May 7, 1983, restoring the devices to full operability. The hangers were visually examined and no defects were noted; the devices were satisfactorily tested. To prevent future problems of this type, a general procedure for the installation of lead shielding is being written. The procedure includes steps to insure that any hanger pins installed are removed prior to restoration of the system involved to an operable status.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-074