

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | ①

0	1	N	J	S	G	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	9						14	15	25										26	30					57	58		
		LICENSEE CODE								LICENSE NUMBER											LICENSE TYPE								

CON'T

7 8 60 61 68 69 73 75 80

REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

0 1 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 0 5 1 2 8 3 8 0 6 0 1 8 3 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On May 12, 1983, during routine shutdown operation, the Senior Shift Supervisor was

0 3 notified that the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System design was not

0 4 consistent with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.d.3.

0 5 Accordingly surveillance for the requirement had not been performed since system start-

0 6 up. The system was in fact operable as demonstrated by other surveillance and present

0 7 testing. The event constituted inadequacy in the implementation of procedural controls

0 8 in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9c.

[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation revealed the discrepancy had been overlooked until the present refueling.

1 1 Testing was performed and revealed the system was capable of meeting the surveillance

1 2 requirement. A license change will be submitted to lower the specification to a

1 3 more realistic value in view of system design.

1	4																	80																																																							
7	8	9																	80																																																						
FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS (30)			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)										80																																																			
1	5	G	28	0	0	0	29	NA	B	31	Surveillance Testing										80																																																				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
ACTIVITY CONTENT			RELEASED OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)						LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)										80																																																			
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA																	80																																																		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	2	38	NA	

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
1	H	40	NA

1 9 2 42 NA

7 8 9 10 80
PUBLICATION
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
2 0 N (44) NA

NAME OF PREPARER R. Erabm

PHONE: (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancock Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 9, 1983

Mr. J. Allan
Acting Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Allan:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-020/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.c, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-020/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:kls

CC: Distribution

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Report Number: 83-020/03L
Report Date: 06-01-83
Occurrence Date: 05-12-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System -
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement Inconsistent
with System Design and FSAR.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-083.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1000 hours, May 12, 1983, during routine shutdown operation, the Senior Shift Supervisor received notification that the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System design was not consistent with the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.d.3. Accordingly, surveillance testing to demonstrate compliance with the requirement had not been performed since system startup. The Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System was in fact operable throughout the occurrence, as demonstrated by satisfactory completion of the remaining surveillance requirements and recent testing of the system.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The surveillance requirement specifies that the system maintain 1/4 inch W.G. positive pressure in the Control Room during operation in the mixed air mode (makeup air supply via the HEPA filter train). The system was not designed to meet this requirement, however. A limited amount of outside air is introduced in the mixed air mode to insure sufficient fresh air is available for Control Room habitability. The mode would only be utilized when air sampling and meteorological information insure that the outside air is safe for introduction into the Control Room.

The FSAR requires only that the Control Room Area Air Conditioning System maintain the area at a positive pressure during normal operation; it assumes atmospheric pressure in the Control Room with 100 CFM inleakage during operation in the mixed air mode. Testing completed in October 1979 demonstrated that the Control Room Area Air Conditioning System maintained 1/16 inch W.G. during normal operation, in accordance with the design basis of the FSAR. The discrepancy between the Technical Specifications and the FSAR for mixed mode operation was apparently overlooked until the present refueling.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System insures that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the design rating of the equipment and instrumentation cooled by the system, and that the Control Room will remain habitable during and following all credible accident conditions. The operability requirements are consistent with the design criteria of 10 CFR Part 50.

Since as noted, the system was operable throughout the occurrence, no risk to health or safety of the public was involved. The event constituted inadequacy in the implementation of procedural controls which may have resulted in a reduction of the redundancy provided in an engineered safety feature. As such it is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9c.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A meeting was held with the appropriate organizations represented. It was resolved in the meeting that a testing Design Change Request would be performed to determine what positive pressure the system was capable of maintaining. Major paths of leakage would be identified and corrected; possible methods of improving system operation would also be investigated.


Initial testing results indicate that it is possible to maintain greater than 1/8 inch W.G. in the Control Room during the mixed air mode of operation (results met the requirements of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.d.3, although it is felt that a requirement of 1/8 inch W.G. is more realistic for the system design). A License Change Request will accordingly be initiated to revise the surveillance requirement to 1/8 inch W.G. The design change also installs permanent instrumentation for performing the required surveillance.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm

SORC Meeting No. 83-074



General Manager -
Salem Operations