

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0	9	A	B	11	B	12	B	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	Z	15	Z	16			
7	8	9	10		11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20								
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE			REVISION NO.									
17		8	3	21	22	0	1	2	27	0	1	28	29	T	30	31	0	32				
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER						
X	18	X	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	Z	25	Z	9	9	9	26
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50					

NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Cooney PHONE: (215) 841-5020

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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

2301 MARKET STREET  
P.O. BOX 8699  
PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101  
(215) 841-4000

May 25, 1983

Mr. J. M. Allan, Acting Administrator  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

Dear Mr. Allan:

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. A. R. Blough, Region I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on May 12, 1983.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277 & 50-278
Report No.	2-83-12/IT-0
Report Date:	May 25, 1983
Occurrence Date:	May 11, 1983
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R.D. #1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

(1) Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.9 states that:

"Performance of structures, systems, or components that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial

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action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition."

Note: This item is intended to provide for reporting of potentially generic problems.

(2) Technical Specification 3.14.D states that:

1. Fire barrier penetrations including cable penetration barrier, fire doors and fire dampers, protecting the following areas shall be functional\*:
    - 1) Cable Spreading Room
    - 2) Emergency Switchgear Rooms
    - 3) Diesel Generator Rooms
    - 4) Battery Rooms
    - 5) Control Room
  2. All fire barrier penetrations including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers separating portions of safety related systems, required to ensure safe shutdown capability shall be functional.\*\*
  3. If the requirements of 3.14.D.1 or 3.14.D.2 cannot be met, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour. Reactor startup and continued reactor operation is permissible.
- \* Delete when the provisions of 3.14.D.2 become effective.
- \*\* Effective upon completion of licensee's fire barrier upgrade program in accordance with the implementation schedule approved by correspondence dated February 4, 1982, (J. F. Stolz, NRC, to E. G. Bauer, Jr., Philadelphia Electric Company).

Description of the Event:

During inspection of fire barrier penetrations to identify penetration seals requiring upgrade to 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements, and during later inspections, inadequacies were found in the fire walls and penetration seals in the eight emergency switchgear rooms and the four emergency battery rooms. The inadequacies found include the lack of sealant between the

tops of the walls and the ceilings above, openings in walls above three ventilation ducts, and inadequate penetration seals around conduit. Applicable Technical Specification is 6.9.2.a.9.

Probable Consequences of the Event:

The size of the openings between the tops of the walls and the ceilings above, and the openings around the conduit are considered to be minimal. The sizes of the three openings above the ventilation ducts are substantial. (For reference, see Licensee Security Event Report 85-05 dated May 17, 1983.) These three openings above the ventilation ducts, which are in the west wall of each of the rooms, are adjacent to a heavily travelled hallway. It is expected that early detection and reporting of a fire would have taken place if a fire was to have occurred in this hallway. Additionally, there are smoke detectors located in the eight emergency switchgear rooms and the four emergency battery rooms to provide early warning of a fire in these areas. Therefore, the consequences of these openings are minimal. Firewatches are posted as required by Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.9.

Cause of Occurrence:

Cause of the occurrence was construction or design error and inadequacies in the fire barrier penetration inspection program.

Immediate Corrective Actions:

Upon discovery of the initial problem area, and after additional inspections identified other deficiencies, firewatches, as required by Technical Specification 3.14.D.3, were posted on one side of all the walls that have deficiencies. Additional fire wall and fire barrier penetration inspections are continuing as a result of the deficiencies found. Temporary sealing followed by seal upgrade and permanent repair are anticipated at the present time.

Future Corrective Actions:

The gaps between the tops of the walls and the ceiling above, the three openings in the walls above the ventilation ducts, and the penetration seals around the conduit will be sealed with a silicon foam-based material. Steel plates will be installed at the bottom of the openings above the ventilation ducts. The openings around the ventilation ducts will then be sealed. These actions are presently expected to be completed by the end of

Mr. J. M. Allan


Page 4

August. Firewatches will remain posted as required by Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.9.

Previous Occurrences:

None.

Sincerely,



Superintendent  
Nuclear Generation Division

Attachment

cc: A. R. Blough, Site Inspector  
Peach Bottom

Document Control Desk