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DOCKETED  
USNRC October 15, 1982

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OFFICE OF SECRETARY  
DOCKETING & SERVICE  
BRANCH

Chairman Nunzio Palladino  
Commissioner John F. Ahearn  
Commissioner Victor Gilinsky  
Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts  
Commissioner James K. Asselstine  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
1717 H Street  
Washington, D.C. 20555

50-247

Re: Commission Meeting, October 21, 1982  
Discussion of Staff Action on Emergency Planning  
at Indian Point

Dear Commissioners:

We have noted with interest the concern expressed by the Commission about the involvement of local officials in the Indian Point Radiological Emergency Response Plan revisions.

For example, on page 21 of the transcript of the September 9 meeting of the Commission, Commissioner Ahearn asks, "Could you say a few words about the relationship between the state and the local governments in the resolution of this? My impression from reading your report...is that many of the problems are at the county level, that is it (sic) county plans or country (sic) arrangements or county funding that has to be obtained."

We are writing to call your attention to the fact that serious deficiencies in emergency preparedness will not be corrected precisely because New York State and FEMA are not directly addressing the concerns of local officials by involving them in current changes.

Village, town, and county officials have said in the strongest terms that the present plans cannot be implemented, and that no plans can be implemented without a massive infusion of funds.

Indeed, they have pointed out that some problems on the local level, such as the road system and the refusal of emergency workers (and the public) to co-operate, cannot be overcome with any amount of money.

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Sonny Hall, Vice-President of Transport Workers Union Local 100, has said in pre-filed testimony that "This Union will not allow any member of our Union to be involved unless each and every detail has been discussed with us and then, of course, with our members."

On May 25, 1982, New York State United Teachers, Educational District #15, recommended that a resolution be adopted by locals to "notify government authorities charged with approval of this plan that it is considered unrealistic, unworkable, and unacceptable to the membership of Westchester-Putnam NYSUT locals."

Frank C. Bohlander, Westchester County Commissioner of Public Works, said in his pre-filed testimony, "Personnel participating from the Division of Road Maintenance have never been given adequate training by the consultant. Their response in an actual event remains questionable."

Sheriff Daniel P. Guido, Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Public Safety, included the following comment in his pre-filed testimony: "...there still may be some question as to the reaction of emergency workers when faced with a choice of attending to the immediate needs of their own families, who may live in an affected area, or fulfilling their assigned responsibilities under this plan..."

Ed Connelly, and Emergency Medical Technician with the Ossining Volunteer Ambulance Corps, has submitted pre-filed testimony in which he states, "I resent the implication that I will give up all personal considerations to assist in an evacuation attempt."

At the very least we would expect close co-operation between FEMA, New York State, and local officials. Instead we find that bi-weekly meetings have been held between the State, licensees, FEMA, and NRC staff without local officials. Only one Task Force on revisions includes one county representative. It has been stated that "it would be a waste of their time" for local officials to attend the bi-weekly meetings.

The attitude towards those who bear the burden of implementing these plans seems to be, "don't call us, we'll call you. Never mind telling us what you can do or need to do; we'll tell you what you must do." For example, when Rockland County officials detail a need for 12 monitoring teams to track the amount and direction of a radiation release, the State Radiological Emergency Planning Group refuses to consider more than three.

Furthermore, the State insists that monitoring equipment provided and maintained by the licensees is acceptable, while the counties, especially Rockland, have expressed a completely justified reluctance to depend on equipment over which they have no control. In any emergency response, of course, radiation monitoring is of the essence. All other actions flow from that information.

NRC and FEMA representatives have been disturbingly complacent in their bi-weekly meetings with State and licensee officials. There is no evidence of probing questions about details of preparedness, especially regarding numbers and percentages. A correct evaluation of the plans must include

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answers to the following basic questions: How many people and pieces of equipment are needed, how many are ready or on hand, what percentage does this represent, and what percentage will be deemed "adequate?"

FEMA is satisfied to accept false reassurances from State representatives that the State can and will take "compensatory measures" to correct local deficiencies. For example, all problems which flow from Rockland County's refusal to participate in the current planning effort will be solved, according to the revisers, by inserting a sentence at 16 places in the text of the plans, to the effect that "Where a county does not have a plan or is unable or unwilling to implement a plan, the Governor of New York will declare a state of emergency, field a State management team, and direct the use of State and local resources.

This is a prime example of the laughable but tragic disparity between planning and preparedness. What resources will the Governor direct? The fact is that New York State does not have enough money, equipment, or trained personnel either. New York State is in a worse position than counties to cope with unfamiliar local roads. New York State will be dependent on the same communications systems that are inadequate for a county response. Notes of a meeting in Mt. Kisco, New York on April 19, 1982, include the following: "The telephone company stated that any public order to evacuate or to prepare for evacuation would probably result in a traffic overload in central offices within the emergency planning zone."

Most important, according to a conclusion of law reached by the State of New York Department of Public Service in a Memorandum dated July 9, 1982, "The State cannot require a locality to participate in training, exercises, or other activities necessary to the development of a plan," but "In the event of a radiological emergency the State has the authority to require a locality to take specific actions."

After a radiological emergency has begun will be far too late to reach an adequate level of preparedness. Supplies, equipment, trained workers, and back-up communications systems must be in place, ready to roll at a moment's notice, if the 17 million people within 50 miles of Indian Point are to have any protection against a significant release of radiation.

New York State officials from the Radiological Emergency Planning Group are definitely nervous about what the Commission plans to do at the end of the 120 day clock. There is great hope, based on discussion with NRC staff, that all that will be required is an "update" or a "progress report." But treating the emergency plan as a "dynamic process" allows government officials to avoid their ultimate responsibility in protecting the health and safety of people affected by Indian Point. A "moving target" is created, and the intervenors and Interested States are prevented from focusing on a "freeze frame" picture of the "status and degree of conformity" of emergency planning efforts as required by Commission questions 3 and 4 in the order of January 8, 1981.

A plan which is deemed "adequate" on paper may not stand up in actual practice. The frontline emergency workers have never been involved in the planning process. The average fire fighter, police officer, ambulance

technician, bus driver, tow truck operator, teacher and parent has no more idea now that he or she had three months or three years ago of how to help the public escape from the consequences of nuclear emergency.

Whatever the plans say, a true picture regarding the following facts will not be revealed by referring to them:


- \* Off-site emergency workers have not been adequately trained.
- \* Reception centers are not adequately prepared for their role in an evacuation.
- \* Bus drivers have not negotiated a contract which includes the heroic task they are called upon to perform.
- \* The required number of buses cannot be timely mobilized to evacuate school children and the transportation dependent population.
- \* The road networks are not adequate to handle the bus, auto, and emergency vehicle traffic which will result from an accident at Indian Point.
- \* Tow truck operators have not been identified for agreements to station themselves at pre-designated locations along evacuation routes.
- \* All the frail elderly, handicapped, and special needs populations have not been identified and provided for.
- \* The sizeable transient population cannot be adequately notified and provided for.
- \* Many parents, teachers, and emergency workers will not co-operate with the roles assigned them in the plans.
- \* Equipment which will be needed by emergency workers has not been provided and stored in easily accessible pre-designated locations.
- \* Even though the problem has long been identified and is easy to solve, an adequate number of proper dosimeters has not been distributed.
- \* There are not enough zeolite filters for the monitoring teams.
- \* The plans are based on outdated population figures.
- \* Money to finance radiological emergency preparedness has long been promised but has not been authorized or provided by the State or by local governments.


Intervenor and Interested State witnesses have pointed out these and many other major concerns which the FEMA review process has translated into "minor" deficiencies. As far as the public is concerned, these defects are paramount. The true standard of an adequate emergency plan should be co-operation and commitment from the affected populace.


The revision process is no more than an editorial job: words and phrases are added and deleted in a bulky document, and FEMA acts as senior editor, signing off on a final, "acceptable" version. None of this has any relation to actual preparedness in the real world of snowstorms, flat tires, and human error. Confidence in official government information and orders will be further destroyed if practical details are ignored planning process.


cc: Official Service List  
The Hon. John T. Grant  
The Hon. Sam Gdanski  
The Hon. Hugh Carey  
House Sub-Committee on  
Energy, Conservation and Power  
Mr. Roger Kowieski  
Mr. Lee Thomas  
Mr. Brian Grimes  
Mr. Frank Petrone


Very truly yours,

  
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